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Does Performance-Based Managerial Compensation Affect Subsequent Corporate Performance?

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Author Info
John M. Abowd
Abstract

An effective performance-based compensation system must increase the probability of high performance corporate outcomes in order to justify the incremental expense relative to a straight salary system. A positive relation between current performance and current compensation indicates that the pay system is performance-based in practice, if not explicitly. This study considers whether increasing the sensitivity of current compensation to current performance is associated with higher performance in the future. For accounting-based performance measures, there is only weak evidence that greater performance-based compensation is associated with improved future performance. However, for economic and market performance measures, there is stronger evidence. Payment of an incremental 10% bonus for good economic performance is associated with a 30 to 90 basis point increase in the expected after tax gross economic return in the following fiscal year. Payment of an incremental raise of 10' following a good stock market performance is associated with a 400 to 1200 basis point increase in expected total shareholder return. These results are comparable in magnitude when compared to the intrinsic variability of the performance measure considered.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 3149.

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Date of creation: Oct 1989
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Publication status: published as ILRR, Vol. 43, no. 3 (1990): 52S-73S.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:3149

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  1. John M. Abowd & George T. Milkovich & John M. Hannon, 1990. "The effects of human resource management decisions on shareholder value," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, ILR School, Cornell University, vol. 43(3), pages 203-236, February.
  2. Masson, Robert Tempest, 1971. "Executive Motivations, Earnings, and Consequent Equity Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 79(6), pages 1278-92, Nov.-Dec.. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Jensen, M.C. & Murphy, K.J., 1988. "Performance Pay And Top Management Incentives," Papers 88-04, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
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  4. Murphy, Kevin J., 1985. "Corporate performance and managerial remuneration : An empirical analysis," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(1-3), pages 11-42, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Ross, Stephen A, 1973. "The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 134-39, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Bronwyn H. Hall & Clint Cummins & Elizabeth S. Laderman & Joy Mundy, 1988. "The R&D Master File Documentation," NBER Technical Working Papers 0072, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Lewellen, Wilbur & Loderer, Claudio & Martin, Kenneth, 1987. "Executive compensation and executive incentive problems : An empirical analysis," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 287-310, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. William C. Brainard & Matthew D. Shapiro & John B. Shoven, 1990. "Fundamental Value and Market Value," NBER Working Papers 3452, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Healy, Paul M., 1985. "The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(1-3), pages 85-107, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Lambert, Richard A. & Larcker, David F., 1985. "Golden parachutes, executive decision-making, and shareholder wealth," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(1-3), pages 179-203, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 1990. "Relative performance evaluation for chief executive officers," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, ILR School, Cornell University, vol. 43(3), pages 30-51, February.
  13. Lewellen, Wilbur G & Huntsman, Blaine, 1970. "Managerial Pay and Corporate Performance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 60(4), pages 710-20, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Lazear, Edward P, 1986. "Salaries and Piece Rates," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(3), pages 405-31, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Tehranian, Hassan & Waegelein, James F., 1985. "Market reaction to short-term executive compensation plan adoption," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(1-3), pages 131-144, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Lazear, Edward P, 1979. "Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1261-84, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. Bhagat, Sanjai & Brickley, James A. & Lease, Ronald C., 1985. "Incentive effects of stock purchase plans," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 195-215, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Ronald G. Ehrenberg & George T. Milkovich, 1987. "Compensation and Firm Performance," NBER Working Papers 2145, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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