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Rachats d'entreprise avec endettement (LBO et MBO) : motivations micro-économiques, effets sur l'efficacité des entreprises et risques macro-économiques

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  • Francois Lecointe
  • Philippe Ducos
  • Patrick Artus
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    Abstract

    [ger] Unternehmensübernahme mit Verschuldung (LBO und MBO) : mikroökonomische Gründe, Auswirkungen auf die Leistungsfähigkeit der Unternehmen und makroökonomische Risiken, . von Patrick Artus, Philippe Ducos, François Lecointe.. . Nach einem Abriß der wichtigsten Merkmale der LBO- und MBO-Bewegung in den Vereinigten Staaten werden zunächst deren mikroökonomische Gründe analysiert und diese dann mit den Gründen verglichen, die für die Wahl eines hohen Verschuldungsgrads und der benachbarten Transaktionen wie Unternehmensfusion und aufkauf ausschlaggebend sind. Anhand des typischen LBO-Modells werden die Informationsasymmetrien und die Konflikte zwischen Aktionären und Managern sowie der sich daraus ergebende Verlust an Leistungsfähigkeit, insbesondere bei der Wahl des Investitionsprogramms, aufgezeigt. Der mikroökonomische Gewinn der LBOs wird durch das vermehrte Konkursrisiko infolge der Zunahme der Verschuldung ausgeglichen. Insgesamt gesehen ist somit nicht sicher, daß die LBOs einen positiven Effekt haben. Dieser Punkt wird auf der Grundlage makroökonomischer Daten der Vereinigten Staaten untersucht. [spa] Rescate de empresas con endeudamiento (LBO y MBO): motivaciones microeconómicas, efectos sobre la efîcacia de las empresas y riesgos macroeconómicos, . por Patrick Artus, Philippe Ducos y François Lecointe.. . Tras presentar un resumen de las principales caracteristicas del movimiento de LBO y MBO en los Estados Unidos, los autores del presente artículo analizan los motivos microeconórnicos y los comparan con aquellos de la elección de un elevado efecto de palanca de endeudamiento y con operaciones semej antes, es decir, las fusiones y adquisiciones. El modelo típico de LBO pone de relieve las asimetrfas de información y los conflictos entre accionistas y directivos, y la pérdida de eficacia que de ello résulta, principalmente en relación con la determinación del programa de inversiones. Las ventajas microeconómicas de los LBO pueden ser contrarrestadas por el mayor riesgo de quiebra debido al aumento del endeudamiento. Por consiguiente, no puede afirmarse que los LBO tengan un efecto favorable. Este punto se analiza a partir de datos macroeconómicos estadounidenses. [eng] Purchasing Firms with borrowed funds (Leveraged Buyouts and Management Buyouts): Micro-Economic Reasons, Effects on the Efficiency of the Firms and Macro-economic Risks, . by Patrick Artus, Philippe Ducos, François Lecointe.. . After having summarized the main features of the LBO/MBO movement in the United States, we analyzed the microeconomic reasons behind such operations, comparing them to those involving the choice of the leverage of a high debt level and those of mergers and acquisitions, similar to the former in many respects. The typical LBO model is based on asymmetry in information and conflicts between managers and shareholders and the resulting loss of efficiency, in particular, as far as the choice of an investment programme is concerned. The microeconomic benefit of LBOs can however be offset by the increase in bankruptcy risk resulting from the increase in the debt level. It is not sure that, on the whole and at the macroeconomic level, LBOs have favourable effects. Lastly this point is examined from an empirical point of view using macroeconomic data for the United States. [fre] Rachats d'entreprise avec endettement (LBO et MBO) : motivations micro-économiques, effets sur l'efficacité des entreprises et risques macro-économiques, . par Patrick Artus, Philippe Ducos, Francois Lecointe.. . Après un rappel des traits majeurs du mouvement de LBO et MBO aux Etats-Unis, on en analyse les motifs micro-économiques, et on les compare à ceux du choix d'un levier d'endettement élevé et des opérations voisines que sont les fusions et acquisitions. Le modèle typique de LBO met en avant les asymétries d'information et les conflits entre actionnaires et managers, et la perte d'efficacité qui en résulte, en particulier dans le choix du programme d'investissement. Le gain micro-économique des LBO peut être compensé par le risque accru de faillite dû à la hausse de l'endettement. Il n'est donc pas sûr qu'au total les LBO aient un effet favorable. Ce point est étudié à partir de données macro-économiques américaines.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Économie & prévision.

    Volume (Year): 102 (1992)
    Issue (Month): 1 ()
    Pages: 89-104

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    Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_1992_num_102_1_5278

    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.1992.5278
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