This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Run-up, toeholds, and agency effects in mergers and acquisitions: evidence from an emerging market

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Jorge Farinha () (CETE, Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Porto)
Francisco Miranda () (PME Capital - Sociedade Portuguesa de Capital de Risco, SA)
Abstract

This paper analyses some particular characteristics of merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions in an emerging market (Portugal) using a sample of 52 M&A targets between 1989 and 2001. Our evidence shows that the run-up effect in the Portuguese market is of a significantly larger magnitude (as a proportion of total abnormal returns for targets) than the one shown in studies for well developed capital markets (UK and US). In fact, the cumulative run-up target stock price abnormal increase in this emerging market is on average 13% in the 40 days before the M&A announcement, which corresponds to almost sixty percent of the entire cumulative abnormal return of 23% enjoyed by target shareholders around the announcement date (-40,+40). The presence of acquirers’ toeholds in targets is positively related to the relative magnitude of such run-up effect, while hostility and the presence of large shareholders in the target have a negative impact. Evidence is also presented that abnormal returns for both bidders and targets are substantially lower in bearish markets as compared to bullish markets, with acquirers experiencing sizeable negative abnormal returns in bear markets but significantly positive ones in bull periods. Overall, our results caution for the existence of particularities of M&A transactions in emerging markets in comparison to well developed markets, and point to a number of research directions that are relevant both to emerging and developed markets.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.fep.up.pt/investigacao/cete/papers/dp0311.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto in its series CETE Discussion Papers with number 0311.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length: 53 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:por:cetedp:0311

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Rua Dr. Roberto Frias, 4200 PORTO
Phone: 351-22-5571100
Fax: 351-22-5505050
Email:
Web page: http://www.fep.up.pt/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Rosa Forte).

Related research
Keywords: mergers and acquisitions run-up agency theory emerging markets

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies
G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets
G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure
G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Jensen, Michael C. & Ruback, Richard S., 1983. "The market for corporate control : The scientific evidence," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-4), pages 5-50, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Demsetz, Harold & Lehn, Kenneth, 1985. "The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(6), pages 1155-77, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Hirshleifer, David & Titman, Sheridan, 1990. "Share Tendering Strategies and the Success of Hostile Takeover Bids," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 295-324, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Franks, Julian & Mayer, Colin, 1996. "Hostile takeovers and the correction of managerial failure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(1), pages 163-181, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Bradley, Michael & Desai, Anand & Kim, E. Han, 1988. "Synergistic gains from corporate acquisitions and their division between the stockholders of target and acquiring firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 3-40, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Slusky, Alexander R & Caves, Richard E, 1991. "Synergy, Agency, and the Determinants of Premia Paid in Mergers," Journal of Industrial Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 39(3), pages 277-96, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Comment, Robert & Schwert, G. William, 1995. "Poison or placebo? Evidence on the deterrence and wealth effects of modern antitakeover measures," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 3-43, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Scholes, Myron & Williams, Joseph, 1977. "Estimating betas from nonsynchronous data," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 309-327, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Agrawal, Anup & Jaffe, Jeffrey F & Mandelker, Gershon N, 1992. " The Post-merger Performance of Acquiring Firms: A Re-examination of an Anomaly," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1605-21, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Bradley, Michael, 1980. "Interfirm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Control," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(4), pages 345-76, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Hasbrouck, Joel, 1985. "The characteristics of takeover targets and other measures," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 351-362, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, 1980. "Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(1), pages 42-64, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Scherer, F M, 1988. "Corporate Takeovers: The Efficiency Arguments," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 69-82, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Asquith, Paul, 1983. "Merger bids, uncertainty, and stockholder returns," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-4), pages 51-83, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Holderness, Clifford G. & Sheehan, Dennis P., 1985. "Raiders or saviors? The evidence on six controversial investors," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 555-555, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Palepu, Krishna G., 1986. "Predicting takeover targets : A methodological and empirical analysis," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 3-35, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Mandelker, Gershon, 1974. "Risk and return: The case of merging firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 303-335, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Warga, Arthur & Welch, Ivo, 1993. "Bondholder Losses in Leveraged Buyouts," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 6(4), pages 959-82. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  20. Firth, Michael, 1980. "Takeovers, Shareholder Returns, and the Theory of the Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 94(2), pages 235-60, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. G. William Schwert, 2000. "Hostility in Takeovers: In the Eyes of the Beholder?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(6), pages 2599-2640, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  22. Goergen, Marc & Renneboog, Luc, 2003. "Shareholder Wealth Effects of European Domestic and Cross-Border Takeover Bids," EIFC - Technology and Finance Working Papers 20, United Nations University, Institute for New Technologies. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  23. Asquith, K Paul & Kim, E Han, 1982. " The Impact of Merger Bids on the Participating Firms' Security Holders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 37(5), pages 1209-28, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  24. Eckbo, B. Espen & Langohr, Herwig, 1989. "Information disclosure, method of payment, and takeover premiums : Public and private tender offers in France," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 363-403. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  25. Malatesta, Paul H., 1983. "The wealth effect of merger activity and the objective functions of merging firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-4), pages 155-181, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  26. Firth, Michael, 1979. "The Profitability of Takeovers and Mergers," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 89(354), pages 316-28, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  27. Dodd, Peter & Ruback, Richard, 1977. "Tender offers and stockholder returns : An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 351-373, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  28. Lang, Larry H. P. & Stulz, ReneM. & Walkling, Ralph A., 1989. "Managerial performance, Tobin's Q, and the gains from successful tender offers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 137-154, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  29. Stulz, Rene M & Walkling, Ralph A & Song, Moon H, 1990. " The Distribution of Target Ownership and the Division of Gains in Successful Takeovers," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(3), pages 817-33, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  30. Franks, Julian & Harris, Robert & Titman, Sheridan, 1991. "The postmerger share-price performance of acquiring firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 81-96, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  31. Schipper, Katherine & Thompson, Rex, 1983. "Evidence on the capitalized value of merger activity for acquiring firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-4), pages 85-119, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  32. Kaplan, Steven N & Weisbach, Michael S, 1992. " The Success of Acquisitions: Evidence from Divestitures," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 47(1), pages 107-38, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  33. Kee H. Chung & Stephen W. Pruitt, 1994. "A Simple Approximation of Tobin's q," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 23(3), Fall.
  34. Lindenberg, Eric B & Ross, Stephen A, 1981. "Tobin's q Ratio and Industrial Organization," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 54(1), pages 1-32, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  35. Asquith, Paul & Bruner, Robert F. & Mullins, David Jr., 1983. "The gains to bidding firms from merger," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-4), pages 121-139, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  36. Becht, Marco & Roell, Ailsa, 1999. "Blockholdings in Europe:: An international comparison1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 43(4-6), pages 1049-1056, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  37. Ravenscraft, David J. & Scherer, F. M., 1989. "The profitability of mergers," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 7(1), pages 101-116, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  38. Shivdasani, Anil, 1993. "Board composition, ownership structure, and hostile takeovers," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1-3), pages 167-198, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  39. Perfect, Steven B. & Wiles, Kenneth W., 1994. "Alternative constructions of Tobin's q: An empirical comparison," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 313-341, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  40. Dimson, Elroy, 1979. "Risk measurement when shares are subject to infrequent trading," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 7(2), pages 197-226, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  41. Assem Safieddine & Sheridan Titman, 1999. "Leverage and Corporate Performance: Evidence from Unsuccessful Takeovers," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(2), pages 547-580, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  42. Berger, Philip G. & Ofek, Eli, 1995. "Diversification's effect on firm value," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 39-65, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  43. Pound, John, 1988. "The information effects of takeover bids and resistance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 207-227, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  44. Travlos, Nickolaos G, 1987. " Corporate Takeover Bids, Methods of Payment, and Bidding Firms' Stock Returns," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 42(4), pages 943-63, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  45. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1986. "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 461-88, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  46. Servaes, Henri, 1991. " Tobin's Q and the Gains from Takeovers," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 46(1), pages 409-19, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS also indexes book chapters.

This page was last updated on 2008-10-31.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.