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Golden parachutes, executive decision-making, and shareholder wealth

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  • Lambert, Richard A.
  • Larcker, David F.
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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V87-479D89N-R/2/2febcef81e6c97cb5ff9927de06d9e6c
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Accounting and Economics.

    Volume (Year): 7 (1985)
    Issue (Month): 1-3 (April)
    Pages: 179-203

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:7:y:1985:i:1-3:p:179-203

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jae

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    Cited by:
    1. Evans, Jocelyn & Noe, Thomas H. & Thornton, John Jr., 1997. "Regulatory distortion of management compensation: The case of golden parachutes for bank managers," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 21(6), pages 825-848, June.
    2. Sokolyk, Tatyana, 2011. "The effects of antitakeover provisions on acquisition targets," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 612-627, June.
    3. Strickland, Deon & Wiles, Kenneth W. & Zenner, Marc, 1996. "A requiem for the USA Is small shareholder monitoring effective?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 319-338, February.
    4. Yermack, David, 2006. "Flights of fancy: Corporate jets, CEO perquisites, and inferior shareholder returns," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 211-242, April.
    5. Martijn Cremers & Allen Ferrell, 2009. "Thirty Years of Corporate Governance: Firm Valuation & Stock Returns," Yale School of Management Working Papers amz2485, Yale School of Management, revised 08 Nov 2009.
    6. Heitzman, Shane, 2011. "Equity grants to target CEOs during deal negotiations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 251-271.
    7. Chongwoo Choe, 2006. "Optimal CEO Compensation: Some Equivalence Results," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(1), pages 171-201, January.
    8. Sarig, Oded H. & Talmor, Eli, 1997. "In defense of defensive measures," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 277-297, June.
    9. Fich, Eliezer M. & Cai, Jie & Tran, Anh L., 2011. "Stock option grants to target CEOs during private merger negotiations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(2), pages 413-430, August.
    10. Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, 2001. "Event Studies and the Law - Part I: Technique and Corporate Litigation," Yale School of Management Working Papers amz2475, Yale School of Management, revised 01 Jan 2002.
    11. Lefanowicz, Craig E. & Robinson, John R. & Smith, Reed, 2000. "Golden parachutes and managerial incentives in corporate acquisitions: evidence from the 1980s and 1990s," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 215-239, July.
    12. Pearce II, John A. & Robinson, Richard Jr., 2004. "Hostile takeover defenses that maximize shareholder wealth," Business Horizons, Elsevier, vol. 47(5), pages 15-24.
    13. Yermack, David, 2006. "Golden handshakes: Separation pay for retired and dismissed CEOs," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 237-256, September.
    14. Francis, Bill & Hasan, Iftekhar & Sharma, Zenu, 2011. "Incentives and innovation: evidence from CEO compensation contracts," Research Discussion Papers 17/2011, Bank of Finland.
    15. Meg Adachi-Sato, 2013. "Incentive Pay that Causes Inefficient Managerial Replacement ," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-890, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    16. Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, . "Event Studies and the Law--Part I: Technique and Corporate Litigation," Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Paper Series yale_lepp-1021, Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy.
    17. Sloan, Richard G., 2001. "Financial accounting and corporate governance: a discussion," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-3), pages 335-347, December.
    18. John M. Abowd, 1989. "Does Performance-Based Managerial Compensation Affect Subsequent Corporate Performance?," NBER Working Papers 3149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. Robert Dur & Heiner Schmittdiel, 2013. "Paid to quit," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-174/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
    20. Elijah Brewer, III & William E. Jackson, III & Larry D. Wall, 2006. "When target CEOs contract with acquirers: evidence from bank mergers and acquisitions," Working Paper 2006-28, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    21. Inderst, Roman, 2012. "Job Protection vs. Contracts At-Will: Trading-off Entrenchment and Shirking," MPRA Paper 53851, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    22. Juan Santalo & Carl Kock, 2005. "Corporate governance & the environment: bad discretion, good discretion, and environmental (...)," Working Papers Economia wp05-24, Instituto de Empresa, Area of Economic Environment.
    23. Bebchuk, Lucian & Cohen, Alma & Wang, Charles C.Y., 2014. "Golden Parachutes and the Wealth of Shareholders," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 140-154.
    24. Espahbodi, Hassan & Espahbodi, Pouran, 2003. "Binary choice models and corporate takeover," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 549-574, April.

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