Golden parachutes, executive decision-making, and shareholder wealth
AbstractNo abstract is available for this item.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Accounting and Economics.
Volume (Year): 7 (1985)
Issue (Month): 1-3 (April)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jae
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Yermack, David, 2006. "Flights of fancy: Corporate jets, CEO perquisites, and inferior shareholder returns," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 211-242, April.
- Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, . "Event Studies and the Law--Part I: Technique and Corporate Litigation," Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Paper Series yale_lepp-1021, Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy.
- Lefanowicz, Craig E. & Robinson, John R. & Smith, Reed, 2000. "Golden parachutes and managerial incentives in corporate acquisitions: evidence from the 1980s and 1990s," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 215-239, July.
- Strickland, Deon & Wiles, Kenneth W. & Zenner, Marc, 1996. "A requiem for the USA Is small shareholder monitoring effective?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 319-338, February.
- Pearce II, John A. & Robinson, Richard Jr., 2004. "Hostile takeover defenses that maximize shareholder wealth," Business Horizons, Elsevier, vol. 47(5), pages 15-24.
- Juan Santalo & Carl Kock, 2005. "Corporate governance & the environment: bad discretion, good discretion, and environmental (...)," Working Papers Economia wp05-24, Instituto de Empresa, Area of Economic Environment.
- Yermack, David, 2006.
"Golden handshakes: Separation pay for retired and dismissed CEOs,"
Journal of Accounting and Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 237-256, September.
- Yermack, David, 2006. "Golden Handshakes: Separation Pay for Retired and Dismissed CEOs," SIFR Research Report Series 41, Institute for Financial Research.
- Fich, Eliezer M. & Cai, Jie & Tran, Anh L., 2011. "Stock option grants to target CEOs during private merger negotiations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 101(2), pages 413-430, August.
- Chongwoo Choe, 2006. "Optimal CEO Compensation: Some Equivalence Results," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(1), pages 171-201, January.
- Sarig, Oded H. & Talmor, Eli, 1997. "In defense of defensive measures," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 277-297, June.
- Sokolyk, Tatyana, 2011. "The effects of antitakeover provisions on acquisition targets," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 612-627, June.
- Sloan, Richard G., 2001. "Financial accounting and corporate governance: a discussion," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1-3), pages 335-347, December.
- Evans, Jocelyn & Noe, Thomas H. & Thornton, John Jr., 1997. "Regulatory distortion of management compensation: The case of golden parachutes for bank managers," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 21(6), pages 825-848, June.
- Francis, Bill & Hasan, Iftekhar & Sharma, Zenu, 2011. "Incentives and innovation: evidence from CEO compensation contracts," Research Discussion Papers 17/2011, Bank of Finland.
- Heitzman, Shane, 2011. "Equity grants to target CEOs during deal negotiations," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(2), pages 251-271.
- John M. Abowd, 1989. "Does Performance-Based Managerial Compensation Affect Subsequent Corporate Performance?," NBER Working Papers 3149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Elijah Brewer, III & William E. Jackson, III & Larry D. Wall, 2006. "When target CEOs contract with acquirers: evidence from bank mergers and acquisitions," Working Paper 2006-28, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- Robert Dur & Heiner Schmittdiel, 2013. "Paid to quit," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-174/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
- Meg Sato, 2013. "Incentive Pay that Causes Inefficient Managerial Replacement," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-890, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
- Espahbodi, Hassan & Espahbodi, Pouran, 2003. "Binary choice models and corporate takeover," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 549-574, April.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wendy Shamier).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.