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Hatékonyság és eredményesség
[Efficiency and effectiveness]

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  • Wilbur G. Lewellen, -
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    Abstract

    A vállalatok tulajdonosi struktúrája, valamint a vezetők és beosztottak javadalmazási rendszere alapvetően befolyásolja a vállalatok teljesítményét. Mára már elegendő empirikus anyag gyűlt össze a privatizációról, a hitelből történő kivásárlásról és a vállalati teljesítmények, illetve vezetői ösztönzők viszonyáról, amely azt tanúsítja: léteznek hatékony mechanizmusok, amelyek gondoskodnak arról, hogy a felső vezetők a tulajdonosok érdekében álló döntéseket hozzanak.

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    File URL: http://www.kszemle.hu/tartalom/letoltes.php?id=146
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation) in its journal Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences).

    Volume (Year): XLIV (1997)
    Issue (Month): 1 ()
    Pages: 3-12

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    Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:146

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    Postal: Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation) Budapest, Budaörsi út 45., 1112, Hungary
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    References

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    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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    1. Steven N. Kaplan, 1991. "The Staying Power of Leveraged Buyouts," NBER Working Papers 3653, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Boschen, John F & Smith, Kimberly J, 1995. "You Can Pay Me Now and You Can Pay Me Later: The Dynamic Response of Executive Compensation to Firm Performance," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 68(4), pages 577-608, October.
    3. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1988. "Management ownership and market valuation : An empirical analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 293-315, January.
    4. Megginson, William L & Nash, Robert C & van Randenborgh, Matthias, 1994. " The Financial and Operating Performance of Newly Privatized Firms: An International Empirical Analysis," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 49(2), pages 403-52, June.
    5. Wilbur G. Lewellen, 1968. "Executive Compensation in Large Industrial Corporations," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number lewe68-1.
    6. Wilbur G. Lewellen, 1968. "Introduction to "Executive Compensation in Large Industrial Corporations"," NBER Chapters, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, in: Executive Compensation in Large Industrial Corporations, pages 1-9 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Boardman, Anthony E & Vining, Aidan R, 1989. "Ownership and Performance in Competitive Environments: A Comparison of the Performance of Private, Mixed, and State-Owned Enterprises," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(1), pages 1-33, April.
    8. Muscarella, Chris J & Vetsuypens, Michael R, 1990. " Efficiency and Organizational Structure: A Study of Reverse LBOs," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 45(5), pages 1389-1413, December.
    9. Kaplan, Steven N & Stein, Jeremy C, 1993. "The Evolution of Buyout Pricing and Financial Structure in the 1980s," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 108(2), pages 313-57, May.
    10. Wilbur G. Lewellen, 1971. "The Ownership Income of Management," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number lewe71-1.
    11. Mehran, Hamid, 1995. "Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 163-184, June.
    12. Lewellen, Wilbur & Loderer, Claudio & Martin, Kenneth, 1987. "Executive compensation and executive incentive problems : An empirical analysis," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 9(3), pages 287-310, December.
    13. Murphy, Kevin J., 1985. "Corporate performance and managerial remuneration : An empirical analysis," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 7(1-3), pages 11-42, April.
    14. Lewellen, Wilbur G & Huntsman, Blaine, 1970. "Managerial Pay and Corporate Performance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 60(4), pages 710-20, September.
    15. Dianne M. Roden & Wilbur G. Lewellen, 1995. "Corporate Capital Structure Decisions: Evidence from Leveraged Buyouts," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, Financial Management Association, vol. 24(2), Summer.
    16. Tim C. Opler, 1992. "Operating Performance in Leveraged Buyouts: Evidence From 1985 - 1989," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, Financial Management Association, vol. 21(1), Spring.
    17. Kaplan, Steven, 1989. "The effects of management buyouts on operating performance and value," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 217-254.
    18. Masson, Robert Tempest, 1971. "Executive Motivations, Earnings, and Consequent Equity Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 79(6), pages 1278-92, Nov.-Dec..
    19. Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-64, April.
    20. Smith, Abbie J., 1990. "Corporate ownership structure and performance *1: The case of management buyouts," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 143-164, September.
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