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Personnel Economics

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  • Edward P. Lazear
  • Paul Oyer

Abstract

In this review of the personnel economics literature, we introduce key topics of personnel economics, focus on some relatively new findings that have emerged since prior reviews of some or all of the personnel economics literature, and suggest open questions in personnel economics where future research can make valuable contributions to the literature. We explore five aspects of the employment relationship - incentives, matching firms with workers, compensation, skill development, and the organization of work - reviewing the main theories, empirical tests of those theories, and the open questions in each area.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 13480.

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Date of creation: Oct 2007
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Publication status: published as Edward P. Lazear, 1995. "Personnel Economics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121883, December.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:13480

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