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Performance, Promotion, and the Peter Principle

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Author Info
Fairburn, J.A.
Malcomson, J.M.

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number 304.95.

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Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 1995
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:aub:autbar:304.95

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Phone: 34 93 592 1203
Web page: http://pareto.uab.cat
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Related research
Keywords: LABOUR MARKET; WAGES;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
J30 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - General
J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods

Cited by:
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  1. Son Kim & Cheng-Zhong Qin & Yan Yu, 2004. "Bribery in Rank-Order Tournaments," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series wp1-03, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
  2. Edward P. Lazear, 2001. "The Peter Principle: Promotions and Declining Productivity," NBER Working Papers 8094, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Wane, Waly, 2004. "The quality of foreign aid : country selectivity or donors incentives?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3325, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  4. Melero, Eduardo, 2004. "Evidence on Training and Career Paths: Human Capital, Information and Incentives," IZA Discussion Papers 1377, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  5. Robert Dur & Hein Roelfsema, 2006. "Social Exchange and Common Agency in Organizations," Working Papers 06-11, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Hans K. Hvide & Tore Leite, 2003. "A Theory of Capital Structure with Strategic Defaults and Priority Violations," Finance 0311003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Hvide, Hans K & Kaplan, Todd, 2003. "Delegated Job Design," CEPR Discussion Papers 3907, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Sliwka, Dirk, 2004. "On the Notion of Responsibility in Organizations," IZA Discussion Papers 1423, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Christian Belzil & Michael Bognanno, 2005. "Promotions, Demotions, Halo Effects and Earnings Dynamics of American Executives," IZA Discussion Papers 1630, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  10. Alexander K. Koch & Julia Nafziger, 2007. "Job Assignments under Moral Hazard: The Peter Principle Revisited," IZA Discussion Papers 2973, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  11. Lazear, Edward P., 2003. "The Peter Principle: A Theory of Decline," IZA Discussion Papers 759, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  12. Ingmar Nyman & Jason G. Cummins, 2005. "Information Management in Rank-Order Tournaments," Hunter College Department of Economics Working Papers 413, Hunter College: Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  13. Jan Zabojnik, 2008. "Promotion Tournaments in Market Equilibrium," Working Papers 1193, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  14. Matthias Kräkel, 2002. "U-type versus J-type Tournaments as Alternative Solutions to the Unverifiability Problem," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse3_2002, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  15. Julia Nafziger, 2008. "Job Assignments, Intrinsic Motivation and Explicit Incentives," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse5_2008, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  16. Ingmar Nyman & Jason G. Cummins, 2007. "“Yes-Men in Tournaments," Hunter College Department of Economics Working Papers 417, Hunter College: Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
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