Implicit Contracts and the Explanatory Power of Top Executive Compensation for Future Performance
AbstractRecent research suggests that implicit incentive contracts may be based on performance measures that are observable only to the contracting parties. We derive and test implications of this insight for the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance. If corporate boards optimally use both observable and unobservable (to outsiders) measures of executive performance and the unobservable measures are correlated with future firm performance, then unexplained variation in current compensation should predict future variation in firm performance. Further, compensation should be more positively associated with future performance when observable measures are less useful for contracting. Our results are consistent with these hypotheses.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by The RAND Corporation in its journal RAND Journal of Economics.
Volume (Year): 31 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 (Summer)
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- Arantxa Jarque, 2008. "CEO compensation : trends, market changes, and regulation," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Sum, pages 265-300.
- Jan Zabojnik, 2011. "Subjective Evaluations with Performance Feedback," Working Papers 1283, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
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NBER Working Papers
13480, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Dominique Demougin & Oliver Fabel & Christian Thomann, 2009. "Implicit vs. Explicit Incentives: Theory and a Case Study," CESifo Working Paper Series 2645, CESifo Group Munich.
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