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Why Do Some Firms Give Stock Options To All Employees?: An Empirical Examination of Alternative Theories

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Author Info
Oyer, Paul (Stanford U)
Schaefer, Scott (Northwestern U)

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Abstract

Many firms issue stock options to all employees. We consider three potential economic justifications for this practice: providing incentives to employees, inducing employees to sort, and helping firms retain employees. We gather data on firms' stock option grant to middle managers from three distinct sources, and use two methods to assess which theories appear to explain observed granting behavior. First, we directly calibrate models of incentives, sorting and retention, and ask whether observed magnitudes of option grants are consistent with each potential explanation. Second, we conduct a cross-sectional regression analysis of firms option-granting choices. We reject an incentives-based explanation for broad-based stock option plans, and conclude that sorting and retention explanations appear consistent with the data.

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Paper provided by Stanford University, Graduate School of Business in its series Research Papers with number 1772r.

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Date of creation: Feb 2004
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Handle: RePEc:ecl:stabus:1772r

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1987. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 303-28, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Huddart, Steven & Lang, Mark, 1996. "Employee stock option exercises an empirical analysis," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 5-43, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Hall, Brian J. & Murphy, Kevin J., 2002. "Stock options for undiversified executives," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 3-42, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Paul Oyer, 2004. "Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 59(4), pages 1619-1650, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Core, John E. & Guay, Wayne R., 2001. "Stock option plans for non-executive employees," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 253-287, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Friend, Irwin & Blume, Marshall E, 1975. "The Demand for Risky Assets," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(5), pages 900-922, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, 2003. "The Trouble with Stock Options," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 49-70, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, 2003. "The Trouble with Stock Options," NBER Working Papers 9784, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Nittai K. Bergman & Dirk Jenter, 2005. "Employee Sentiment and Stock Option Compensation," NBER Working Papers 11409, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Bull, Clive, 1987. "The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(1), pages 147-59, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Canice Prendergast, 2002. "The Tenuous Trade-off between Risk and Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(5), pages 1071-1102, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Scott Keating, A., 1997. "Determinants of divisional performance evaluation practices," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(3), pages 243-273, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  15. Aboody, David, 1996. "Market valuation of employee stock options," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1-3), pages 357-391, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Paul Gompers & Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, 2003. "Corporate Governance And Equity Prices," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 118(1), pages 107-155, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. Huddart, Steven & Lang, Mark, 2003. "Information distribution within firms: evidence from stock option exercises," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1-3), pages 3-31, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Wang, Jun & Zhang, Ge, 2003. "Heterogeneous beliefs and employee stock options," Working Papers 2003-14, University of New Orleans, Department of Economics and Finance. [Downloadable!]
  2. Cécile Cézanne-Sintès, 2008. "Modern Corporate Changes: Reinstating the Link between the Nature, Boundaries and Governance of the Firm," Post-Print hal-00367732_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  3. Chilosi, Alberto & Damiani, Mirella, 2007. "Stakeholders vs. shareholders in corporate governance," MPRA Paper 2334, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  4. Paul Oyer & Scott Schaefer, 2004. "Compensating Employees Below the Executive Ranks: A Comparison of Options, Restricted Stock, and Cash," NBER Working Papers 10221, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Oyer, Paul & Schaefer, Scott, 2005. "Accounting, Governance, and Broad-Based Stock Option Grants," Research Papers 1821r1, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. [Downloadable!]
  6. Olivier Sautel & Cécile Cézanne-Sintès, 2007. "Firme intensive en capital humain et coordination : vers une redéfinition du rapport entre intégration et dé-intégration," Post-Print hal-00331454_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  7. Kevin F. Hallock & Craig Olson, 2006. "The Value of Stock Options to Non-Executive Employees," NBER Working Papers 11950, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Peter Roosenboom & Tjalling van der Goot, 2006. "Broad-based employee stock options grants and IPO firms," Applied Economics, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 38(12), pages 1343-1351, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Robert Dur & Amihai Glazer, 2004. "Optimal Incentive Contracts when Workers envy their Boss," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-046/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 13 Jun 2006. [Downloadable!]
  10. Hvide, Hans K, 2005. "The Quality of Entrepreneurs," CEPR Discussion Papers 4979, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Fredrik Andersson & Matthew Freedman & John C. Haltiwanger & Julia Lane & Kathryn L. Shaw, 2006. "Reaching for the Stars: Who Pays for Talent in Innovative Industries?," NBER Working Papers 12435, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Robert A. J. Dur & Amihai Glazer, 2004. "Optimal Incentive Contracts For a Worker Who Envies His Boss," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  13. Zhang, Ge, 2004. "Market valuation and employee stock options," Working Papers 2003-13, University of New Orleans, Department of Economics and Finance. [Downloadable!]
  14. Hvide, Hans K., 2004. "Firm Size and the Quality of Entrepreneurs," Discussion Papers 2004/9, Department of Finance and Management Science, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration. [Downloadable!]
  15. Orana Bandiera & Iwan Barankay & Imran Rasul, 2006. "Incentives for Managers and Inequality Among Workers: Evidence from a Firm Level Experiment," Natural Field Experiments 0015, The Field Experiments Website. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. Guido Friebel & Sergei Guriev, 2004. "Earnings Manipilation and Incentives in Firms," Working Papers w0055, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR), revised Oct 2005. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  17. Gil, Ricard, 2006. "Renegotiation, Learning and Relational Contracting," CEI Working Paper Series 2005-14, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
  18. Lazear, Edward P., 2003. "Output-Based Pay: Incentives, Retention or Sorting?," IZA Discussion Papers 761, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  19. Douglas L. Kruse & Joseph R. Blasi & Rhokeun Park, 2008. "Shared Capitalism in the U.S. Economy? Prevalence, Characteristics, and Employee Views of Financial Participation in Enterprises," NBER Working Papers 14225, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Nittai K. Bergman & Dirk Jenter, 2005. "Employee Sentiment and Stock Option Compensation," NBER Working Papers 11409, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  21. Jean-Etienne De Bettignies & Gilles Chemla, 2008. "Corporate Venturing, Allocation of Talent, and Competition for Star Managers," Post-Print halshs-00365942_v1, HAL. [Downloadable!]
  22. Derek C. Jones & Panu Kalmi & Mikko Mäkinen, 2004. "The Determinants of Stock Option Compensation: Evidence from Finland," Discussion Papers 957, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy. [Downloadable!]
  23. Inderst, Roman & Mueller, Holger M, 2005. "Benefits of Broad-based Option Pay," CEPR Discussion Papers 4878, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  24. Hillegeist, Stephen A. & Peñalva, Fernando, 2004. "Stock option incentives and firm performance," IESE Research Papers D/535, IESE Business School. [Downloadable!]
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