Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives

Contents:

Author Info

  • Paul Oyer
  • Scott Schaefer

Abstract

We survey the Personnel Economics literature, focusing on how firms establish, maintain, and end employment relationships and on how firms provide incentives to employees. This literature has been very successful in generating models and empirical work about incentive systems. Some of the unanswered questions in this area -- for example, the empirical relevance of the risk/incentive tradeoff and the question of whether CEO pay arrangements reflect competitive markets and efficient contracting -- are likely to be very difficult to answer due to measurement problems. The literature has been less successful at explaining how firms can find the right employees in the first place. Economists understand the broad economic forces -- matching with costly search and bilateral asymmetric information -- that firms face in trying to hire. But the main models in this area treat firms as simple black-box production functions. Less work has been done to understand how different firms approach the hiring problem, what determines the firm-level heterogeneity in hiring strategies, and whether these patterns conform to theory. We survey some literature in this area and suggest areas for further research.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w15977.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 15977.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: May 2010
Date of revision:
Publication status: published as Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives, with Scott Schaefer, In: Orley Ashenfelter and David Card, editors: Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol 4b, Great Britain, North Holland, 2011, pp. 1769-1823
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15977

Note: LS
Contact details of provider:
Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Phone: 617-868-3900
Email:
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Jenter, Dirk & Kanaan, Fadi, 2008. "CEO Turnover and Relative Performance Evaluation," Research Papers 1992, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  2. Timothy F. Bresnahan & Erik Brynjolfsson & Lorin M. Hitt, 1999. "Information Technology, Workplace Organization and the Demand for Skilled Labor: Firm-Level Evidence," NBER Working Papers 7136, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Antoni Calvó-Armengol & Matthew O. Jackson, 2004. "The Effects of Social Networks on Employment and Inequality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 426-454, June.
  4. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 71-92, Summer.
  5. Michele Mosca & Francesco Pastore, 2009. "Wage Effects of Recruitment Methods: The Case of the Italian Social Service Sector," AIEL Series in Labour Economics, in: Marco Musella & Sergio Destefanis (ed.), Paid and Unpaid Labour in the Social Economy. An International Perspective, edition 1, chapter 8, pages 115-141 AIEL - Associazione Italiana Economisti del Lavoro.
  6. Robert Gibbons & Lawrence Katz, 1989. "Layoffs and Lemons," Working Papers 629, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section..
  7. Barron, John M & Bishop, John & Dunkelberg, William C, 1985. "Employer Search: The Interviewing and Hiring of New Employees," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 67(1), pages 43-52, February.
  8. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
  9. Joseph G. Altonji & Charles R. Pierret, 1997. "Employer Learning and Statistical Discrimination," NBER Working Papers 6279, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Abowd, J.M. & Kramarz, F. & Margolis, D.N., 1995. "High-Wage Workers and High-Wage Firms," Cahiers de recherche 9503, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
  11. Delfgaauw, Josse & Dur, Robert, 2007. "Signaling and screening of workers' motivation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 62(4), pages 605-624, April.
  12. Bruce Fallick & Charles A. Fleischmann & James B. Rebitzer, 2005. "Job Hopping in Silicon Valley: Some Evidence Concerning the Micro-Foundations of a High Technology Cluster," NBER Working Papers 11710, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  13. Regula Geel & Johannes Mure & Uschi Backes-Gellner, 2008. "Specificity of Occupational Training and Occupational Mobility: An Empirical Study Based on Lazear’s Skill-Weights Approach," Economics of Education Working Paper Series 0038, University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU).
  14. HOLMSTROM, Bengt, . "Moral hazard and observability," CORE Discussion Papers RP -379, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  15. Nick Bloom & John Van Reenen, 2006. "Measuring and Explaining Management Practices Across Firms and Countries," CEP Discussion Papers dp0716, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  16. Huson, Mark R. & Malatesta, Paul H. & Parrino, Robert, 2004. "Managerial succession and firm performance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 237-275, November.
  17. Yannis M. Ioannides & Linda Datcher Loury, 2004. "Job Information Networks, Neighborhood Effects, and Inequality," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 42(4), pages 1056-1093, December.
  18. Uta Schönberg, 2007. "Testing for Asymmetric Employer Learning," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25, pages 651-691.
  19. Abowd, John M. & Haltiwanger, John C. & Lane, Julia & McKinney, Kevin L. & Sandusky, L. Kristin, 2007. "Technology and the Demand for Skill: An Analysis of Within and Between Firm Differences," IZA Discussion Papers 2707, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  20. Patrick Bayer & Stephen L. Ross & Giorgio Topa, 2004. "Place of Work and Place of Residence: Informal Hiring Networks and Labor Market Outcomes," Working papers 2004-07, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Oct 2005.
  21. Peter Kuhn & Kailing Shen, 2009. "Employers’ Preferences for Gender, Age, Height and Beauty: Direct Evidence," NBER Working Papers 15564, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  22. Bull, Clive, 1987. "The Existence of Self-Enforcing Implicit Contracts," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(1), pages 147-59, February.
  23. Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. "Moral Hazard in Teams," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 324-340, Autumn.
  24. Manning, Alan, 2000. " Pretty Vacant: Recruitment in Low-Wage Labour Markets," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 62(0), pages 747-70, Special I.
  25. Björn Bartling & Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 2010. "Screening, competition, and job design: economic origins of good jobs," IEW - Working Papers 470, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
  26. Agrawal, Anup & Knoeber, Charles R. & Tsoulouhas, Theofanis, 2006. "Are outsiders handicapped in CEO successions?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 619-644, June.
  27. Simon Burgess & Julia Lane & David Stevens, 1998. "Hiring Risky Workers: Some Evidence," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(4), pages 669-676, December.
  28. Kuhn, Peter & Skuterud, Mikal Skuterud, 2002. "Internet Job Search and Unemployment Durations," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt8583s24x, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
  29. Betsey Stevenson, 2008. "The Internet and Job Search," NBER Working Papers 13886, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  30. van Ours, Jan & Ridder, Geert, 1992. "Vacancies and the Recruitment of New Employees," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 10(2), pages 138-55, April.
  31. Paul R. Milgrom, 1984. "Job Discrimination, Market Forces and the Invisibility Hypothesis," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 708R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised 1985.
  32. John Pencavel, 2001. "The Response of Employees to Severance Incentives: The University of California's Faculty, 1991-94," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 36(1), pages 58-84.
  33. Vera Brenčič, 2010. "Do Employers Respond to the Costs of Continued Search?," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 72(2), pages 221-245, 04.
  34. Bernhardt, Dan, 1995. "Strategic Promotion and Compensation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(2), pages 315-39, April.
  35. Kugler, Adriana D., 2003. "Employee referrals and efficiency wages," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(5), pages 531-556, October.
  36. Greenwald, Bruce C, 1986. "Adverse Selection in the Labour Market," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(3), pages 325-47, July.
  37. Bandiera, Oriana & Barankay, Iwan & Rasul, Imran, 2009. "Social Connections and Incentives in the Workplace: Evidence from Personnel Data," CEPR Discussion Papers 7114, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  38. Rachel M. Hayes & Paul Oyer & Scott Schaefer, 2004. "Co-Worker Complemetarity and the Stability of Top Management Teams," NBER Working Papers 10350, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  39. Montgomery, James D, 1991. "Social Networks and Labor-Market Outcomes: Toward an Economic Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1407-18, December.
  40. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1995. "Complementarities and fit strategy, structure, and organizational change in manufacturing," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2-3), pages 179-208, April.
  41. Harry J. Holzer, 1987. "Hiring Procedures in the Firm: Their Economic Determinants and Outcomes," NBER Working Papers 2185, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  42. Laura Giuliano & David I. Levine & Jonathan Leonard, 2009. "Manager Race and the Race of New Hires," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(4), pages 589-631, October.
  43. Lori G. Kletzer, 1998. "Job Displacement," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(1), pages 115-136, Winter.
  44. Brencic, Vera, 2007. "Employers' search prior to exhaustion of advance notice period," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 266-270, February.
  45. Ours, J.C. van & Ridder, G., 1993. "Vacancy Durations: Search or Selection?," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-142177, Tilburg University.
  46. Fredrik Andersson & Matthew Freedman & John Haltiwanger & Julia Lane & Kathryn Shaw, 2009. "Reaching for the Stars: Who Pays for Talent in Innovative Industries?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(538), pages F308-F332, 06.
  47. M. J. Andrews & S. Bradley & D. Stott & R. Upward, 2008. "Successful Employer Search? An Empirical Analysis of Vacancy Duration Using Micro Data," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 75(299), pages 455-480, 08.
  48. Xavier Gabaix & Augustin Landier, 2006. "Why Has CEO Pay Increased So Much?," NBER Working Papers 12365, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  49. Antoninis, Manos, 2006. "The wage effects from the use of personal contacts as hiring channels," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 133-146, January.
  50. Canice Prendergast, 2007. "The Motivation and Bias of Bureaucrats," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 180-196, March.
  51. Edward P. Lazear, 2003. "Firm-Specific Human Capital: A Skill-Weights Approach," NBER Working Papers 9679, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  52. David H. Autor & Susan Houseman, 2005. "Do Temporary Help Jobs Improve Labor Market Outcomes for Low-Skilled Workers? Evidence from 'Work First'," NBER Working Papers 11743, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  53. Paul Oyer & Scott Schaefer, 2004. "Why Do Some Firms Give Stock Options to All Employees?: An Empirical Examination of Alternative Theories," NBER Working Papers 10222, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  54. David H. Autor & Lawrence F. Katz & Alan B. Krueger, 1997. "Computing Inequality: Have Computers Changed the Labor Market?," NBER Working Papers 5956, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  55. Fredrik Andersson & Simon Burgess & Julia Lane, 2004. "Cities, Matching and the Productivity Gains of Agglomeration," CEP Discussion Papers dp0648, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  56. Nittai K. Bergman & Dirk Jenter, 2005. "Employee Sentiment and Stock Option Compensation," NBER Working Papers 11409, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  57. Sattinger, Michael, 1993. "Assignment Models of the Distribution of Earnings," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 31(2), pages 831-80, June.
  58. Simon, Curtis J & Warner, John T, 1992. "Matchmaker, Matchmaker: The Effect of Old Boy Networks on Job Match Quality, Earnings, and Tenure," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 10(3), pages 306-30, July.
  59. Bruce Shearer, 2004. "Piece Rates, Fixed Wages and Incentives: Evidence from a Field Experiment," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(2), pages 513-534.
  60. Judith Chevalier & Glenn Ellison, 1999. "Career Concerns Of Mutual Fund Managers," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(2), pages 389-432, May.
  61. David Card & John E. DiNardo, 2002. "Skill-Biased Technological Change and Rising Wage Inequality: Some Problems and Puzzles," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(4), pages 733-783, October.
  62. Paul Oyer, 1998. "Fiscal Year Ends And Nonlinear Incentive Contracts: The Effect On Business Seasonality," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(1), pages 149-185, February.
  63. George Baker & Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 1993. "Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts," NBER Working Papers 4480, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  64. Farber, Henry S & Gibbons, Robert, 1996. "Learning and Wage Dynamics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 111(4), pages 1007-47, November.
  65. Jed DeVaro, 2005. "Internal Promotion Competitions in Firms," Labor and Demography 0508005, EconWPA.
  66. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April.
  67. George-Levi Gayle & Robert A. Miller, 2009. "Has Moral Hazard Become a More Important Factor in Managerial Compensation?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1740-69, December.
  68. Russo, Giovanni & Gorter, Cees & Schettkat, Ronald, 2001. "Searching, hiring and labour market conditions," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(5), pages 553-571, December.
  69. Bruce Shearer, 2004. "Piece Rates, Fixed Wages and Incentives: Evidence from a Field Experiment," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(2), pages 513-534, 04.
  70. Canice Prendergast, 1999. "The Provision of Incentives in Firms," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(1), pages 7-63, March.
  71. Rajesh K. Aggarwal & Andrew A. Samwick, 1999. "The Other Side of the Trade-off: The Impact of Risk on Executive Compensation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(1), pages 65-105, February.
  72. Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-64, October.
  73. Joshua C. Pinkston, 2009. "A Model of Asymmetric Employer Learning with Testable Implications," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 76(1), pages 367-394.
  74. Alessandra Casella & Nobuyuki Hanaki, 2005. "Information channels in labor markets: On the resilience of referral hiring," Discussion Papers 0506-05, Columbia University, Department of Economics.
  75. Garicano, Luis & Hubbard, Thomas N, 2007. "Managerial Leverage Is Limited by the Extent of the Market: Hierarchies, Specialization, and the Utilization of Lawyers' Human Capital," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 50(1), pages 1-43, February.
  76. Wolter Hassink & Giovanni Russo, 2008. "Wage differences between internal and external candidates," International Journal of Manpower, Emerald Group Publishing, vol. 29(8), pages 715-730, November.
  77. DeVaro, Jed & Waldman, Michael, 2006. "The signaling role of promotions: Further theory and empirical evidence," MPRA Paper 1550, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  78. Wheeler, Christopher H, 2001. "Search, Sorting, and Urban Agglomeration," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(4), pages 879-99, October.
  79. Walter Y. Oi, 1962. "Labor as a Quasi-Fixed Factor," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 70, pages 538.
  80. Abbring, J. H. & van Ours, J. C., 1994. "Sequential or non-sequential employers' search?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 44(3), pages 323-328.
  81. Spence, A Michael, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-74, August.
  82. Jonathan V. Beaverstock & James R. Faulconbridge & Sarah J. E. Hall, 2010. "Professionalization, legitimization and the creation of executive search markets in Europe," Journal of Economic Geography, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(6), pages 825-843, November.
  83. Berman, Eli & Bound, John & Griliches, Zvi, 1994. "Changes in the Demand for Skilled Labor within U.S. Manufacturing: Evidence from the Annual Survey of Manufactures," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(2), pages 367-97, May.
  84. van Ours, J C & Ridder, G, 1993. "Vacancy Durations: Search or Selection?," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 55(2), pages 187-98, May.
  85. Glenn Ellison & Edward L. Glaeser, 1999. "The Geographic Concentration of Industry: Does Natural Advantage Explain Agglomeration?," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1862, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  86. Kahn, Lisa B., 2013. "Asymmetric Information between Employers," IZA Discussion Papers 7147, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  87. Monika Hamori, 2006. "Executive Loyalty and Employer Attributes," Working Papers Economia wp06-10, Instituto de Empresa, Area of Economic Environment.
  88. David H. Autor & Lawrence F. Katz & Melissa S. Kearney, 2006. "The Polarization of the U.S. Labor Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 189-194, May.
  89. Ours, J.C. van & Ridder, G., 1992. "Vacancies and recruitment of new employees," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-142178, Tilburg University.
  90. Rachel M. Hayes & Scott Schaefer, 2000. "Implicit Contracts and the Explanatory Power of Top Executive Compensation for Future Performance," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(2), pages 273-293, Summer.
  91. Wallace Hendricks & Lawrence DeBrock & Roger Koenker, 2003. "Uncertainty, Hiring, and Subsequent Performance: The NFL Draft," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(4), pages 857-886, October.
  92. Sherwin Rosen, 1982. "Authority, Control, and the Distribution of Earnings," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 311-323, Autumn.
  93. Baker, George P, 1992. "Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 598-614, June.
  94. Manuel F. Bagues & Mauro Sylos Labini, 2007. "Do On-Line Labor Market Intermediaries Matter? The Impact of AlmaLaurea on the University-to-Work Transition," NBER Working Papers 13621, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  95. Scoones, David & Bernhardt, Dan, 1998. "Promotion, Turnover, and Discretionary Human Capital Acquisition," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 122-41, January.
  96. Thomas N. Hubbard, 2009. "Specialization, Firms, and Markets: The Division of Labor within and between Law Firms," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 25(2), pages 339-371, October.
  97. repec:rje:randje:v:37:y:2006:3:p:521-542 is not listed on IDEAS
  98. Jed DeVaro, 2005. "The Labor Market Effects of Employer Recruitment Choice," Labor and Demography 0508006, EconWPA.
  99. Dan Bernhardt & David Scoones, 1991. "Promotion: Turnover and Preemptive Wage Offers," Working Papers 817, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  100. Tranaes, Torben, 2001. "Raiding Opportunities and Unemployment," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(4), pages 773-98, October.
  101. Waldman, Michael, 1990. "Up-or-Out Contracts: A Signaling Perspective," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 8(2), pages 230-50, April.
  102. Kevin J. Murphy & Jan Zabojnik, 2006. "Managerial Capital and the Market for CEOs," Working Papers 1110, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  103. Boris Groysberg & Linda-Eling Lee & Ashish Nanda, 2008. "Can They Take It With Them? The Portability of Star Knowledge Workers' Performance," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 54(7), pages 1213-1230, July.
  104. Bebchuk, Lucian A. & Fried, Jesse M., 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt81q3136r, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
  105. Paul Oyer & Scott Schaefer, . "Layoffs and Litigation," IPR working papers 98-34, Institute for Policy Resarch at Northwestern University.
  106. Salop, Joanne & Salop, Steven, 1976. "Self-Selection and Turnover in the Labor Market," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(4), pages 619-27, November.
  107. Barron, John M & Berger, Mark C & Black, Dan A, 1997. "Employer Search, Training, and Vacancy Duration," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 35(1), pages 167-92, January.
  108. Bengt Holmstrom & Paul R. Milgrom, 1985. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 742, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  109. Michael Waldman, 1983. "Job Assignments, Signalling nad Efficiency," UCLA Economics Working Papers 286, UCLA Department of Economics.
  110. Bull, Clive & Ornati, Oscar & Tedeschi, Piero, 1987. "Search, Hiring Strategies, and Labor Market Intermediaries," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 5(4), pages S1-17, October.
  111. Paul Oyer, 2004. "Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Effects?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 59(4), pages 1619-1650, 08.
  112. Jed Devaro, 2005. "Employer Recruitment Strategies and the Labor Market Outcomes of New Hires," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 43(2), pages 263-282, April.
  113. Saloner, Garth, 1985. "Old Boy Networks as Screening Mechanisms," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(3), pages 255-67, July.
  114. Edward P. Lazear, 1996. "Performance Pay and Productivity," NBER Working Papers 5672, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  115. Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2001. "Are Ceos Rewarded For Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(3), pages 901-932, August.
  116. Van den Steen, Eric, 2003. "Organizational Beliefs and Managerial Vision," Working papers 4224-01, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
  117. Devine, Theresa J. & Kiefer, Nicolas M., 1991. "Empirical Labor Economics: The Search Approach," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195059366, Octomber.
  118. Scott Schaefer, 1998. "The Dependence Of Pay--Performance Sensitivity On The Size Of The Firm," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 80(3), pages 436-443, August.
  119. Lazear, Edward, 2003. "Firm-Specific Human Capital: A Skill-Weights Approach," IZA Discussion Papers 813, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  120. Joanne Salop & Steve Salop, 1976. "Self-selection and turnover in the labor market," Special Studies Papers 80, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  121. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Technology, Strategy, and Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(3), pages 511-28, June.
  122. Lazear, Edward P, 1979. "Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(6), pages 1261-84, December.
  123. Christopher R. Bollinger & Julie L. Hotchkiss, 2003. "The Upside Potential of Hiring Risky Workers: Evidence from the Baseball Industry," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(4), pages 923-944, October.
  124. Harry Krashinsky, 2002. "Evidence on adverse selection and establishment size in the labor market," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 56(1), pages 84-96, October.
  125. Paul Oyer & Scott Schaefer, 2002. "Litigation Costs and Returns to Experience," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(3), pages 683-705, June.
  126. Brencic, Vera, 2009. "Employers' hiring practices, employment protection, and costly search: A vacancy-level analysis," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(5), pages 461-479, October.
  127. Oyer, Paul & Schaefer, Scott, 2006. "Costs of broad-based stock option plans," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 511-534, October.
  128. Baker, George & Gibbs, Michael & Holmstrom, Bengt, 1994. "The Internal Economics of the Firm: Evidence from Personnel Data," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 109(4), pages 881-919, November.
  129. Chan, William, 1996. "External Recruitment versus Internal Promotion," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(4), pages 555-70, October.
  130. C. Edward Fee, 2003. "Raids, Rewards, and Reputations in the Market for Managerial Talent," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 16(4), pages 1315-1357.
  131. Alessandra Casella & Nobuyuki Hanaki, 2006. "Why Personal Ties Cannot Be Bought," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(2), pages 261-264, May.
  132. Hayes, Rachel M. & Schaefer, Scott, 2009. "CEO pay and the Lake Wobegon Effect," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 280-290, November.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Oriana Bandiera & Luigi Guiso & Andrea Prat & Raffaella Sadun, 2009. "Matching Firms, Managers, and Incentives," EIEF Working Papers Series 0901, Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), revised Feb 2009.
  2. Martin Szydlowski, 2012. "Ambiguity in Dynamic Contracts," Discussion Papers 1543, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  3. James B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor, 2010. "Extrinsic Rewards and Intrinsic Motives: Standard and Behavioral Approaches To Agency and Labor Markets," Economics Working Paper Archive wp_607, Levy Economics Institute.
  4. Alan Manning, 2010. "Imperfect competition in the labour market," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 28729, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  5. Blasco, Sylvie & Pertold-Gebicka, Barbara, 2012. "Employment Policies, Hiring Practices and Firm Performance," IZA Discussion Papers 7013, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  6. Hensvik, Lena & Nordström Skans, Oskar, 2013. "Networks and youth labor market entry," Working Paper Series 2013:23, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
  7. Christian Pfeifer, 2012. "Base Salaries, Bonus Payments, and Work Absence among Managers in a German Company," Working Paper Series in Economics 259, University of Lüneburg, Institute of Economics.
  8. Bartel, Ann P. & Freeman, Richard B. & Ichniowski, Casey & Kleiner, Morris M., 2011. "Can a workplace have an attitude problem? Workplace effects on employee attitudes and organizational performance," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 411-423, August.
  9. Fabling, Richard & Maré, David C., 2013. "Firm-Level Hiring Difficulties: Persistence, Business Cycle and Local Labour Market Influences," IZA Discussion Papers 7534, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15977. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.