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Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives

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  • Paul Oyer
  • Scott Schaefer

Abstract

We survey the Personnel Economics literature, focusing on how firms establish, maintain, and end employment relationships and on how firms provide incentives to employees. This literature has been very successful in generating models and empirical work about incentive systems. Some of the unanswered questions in this area -- for example, the empirical relevance of the risk/incentive tradeoff and the question of whether CEO pay arrangements reflect competitive markets and efficient contracting -- are likely to be very difficult to answer due to measurement problems. The literature has been less successful at explaining how firms can find the right employees in the first place. Economists understand the broad economic forces -- matching with costly search and bilateral asymmetric information -- that firms face in trying to hire. But the main models in this area treat firms as simple black-box production functions. Less work has been done to understand how different firms approach the hiring problem, what determines the firm-level heterogeneity in hiring strategies, and whether these patterns conform to theory. We survey some literature in this area and suggest areas for further research.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 15977.

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Date of creation: May 2010
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Publication status: published as Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives, with Scott Schaefer, In: Orley Ashenfelter and David Card, editors: Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol 4b, Great Britain, North Holland, 2011, pp. 1769-1823
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15977

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  2. Hensvik, Lena & Nordström Skans, Oskar, 2013. "Networks and youth labor market entry," Working Paper Series 2013:23, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
  3. Martin Szydlowski, 2012. "Ambiguity in Dynamic Contracts," Discussion Papers 1543, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  4. Pfeifer, Christian, 2012. "Base Salaries, Bonus Payments, and Work Absence among Managers in a German Company," IZA Discussion Papers 7088, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  5. Blasco, Sylvie & Pertold-Gebicka, Barbara, 2013. "Employment policies, hiring practices and firm performance," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(C), pages 12-24.
  6. Rebitzer, James B. & Taylor, Lowell J., 2011. "Extrinsic Rewards and Intrinsic Motives: Standard and Behavioral Approaches to Agency and Labor Markets," Handbook of Labor Economics, Elsevier.
  7. Alan Manning, 2010. "Imperfect competition in the labour market," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 28729, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  8. Fabling, Richard & Maré, Dave C., 2013. "Firm-Level Hiring Difficulties: Persistence, Business Cycle and Local Labour Market Influences," IZA Discussion Papers 7534, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
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