The Response of Employees to Severance Incentives: The University of California's Faculty, 1991-94
AbstractIn response to huge budgetary shortfalls in the early 1990s, the University of California offered its older and longer service employees financial inducements to leave. This paper analyzes the responses of UC's faculty to three waves of buyout incentives. It is estimated that an individual presented with ten percent higher severance benefits has a seven to eight percent higher probability of quitting. However, quit probabilities are very difficult to forecast with accuracy. This casts doubt on arguments that maintain that buyouts are superior to employer-initiated layoffs as a mechanism to effect large employment changes.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by United Nations World Employment Programme- in its series Papers with number 99-019.
Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
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Postal: International Center for Economic Growth, 243 Kearny Street, San Francisco, California 94108.
WAGES ; EDUCATION;
Other versions of this item:
- John Pencavel, 2001. "The Response of Employees to Severance Incentives: The University of California's Faculty, 1991-94," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 36(1), pages 58-84.
- J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
- J26 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Retirement; Retirement Policies
- I22 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - Educational Finance
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- Irina Khovanskaya & Konstantin Sonin & Maria Yudkevich, 2007.
"Budget Uncertainty and Faculty Contracts: A Dynamic Framework for Comparative Analysis,"
w0112, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR).
- K. Sonin & I. Khovanskaya & M. Yudkevich., 2008. "Budget Uncertainty and Faculty Contracts: A Dynamic Framework for Comparative Analysis," VOPROSY ECONOMIKI, N.P. Redaktsiya zhurnala "Voprosy Economiki", vol. 12.
- Khovanskaya, Irina & Sonin, Konstantin & Yudkevich, Maria, 2008. "Budget Uncertainty and Faculty Contracts: A Dynamic Framework for Comparative Analysis," CEPR Discussion Papers 6744, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Whelan, Kenneth T. & Ehrenberg, Ronald G. & Hallock, Kevin F. & Seeber, Ronald L., 2011.
"Adverse Selection and Incentives in an Early Retirement Program,"
IZA Discussion Papers
6055, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Kenneth T. Whelan & Ronald G. Ehrenberg & Kevin F. Hallock & Ronald L. Seeber, 2011. "Adverse Selection and Incentives in an Early Retirement Program," NBER Working Papers 17538, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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