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Wage Effects of Recruitment Methods: The Case of the Italian Social Service Sector

In: Paid and Unpaid Labour in the Social Economy. An International Perspective

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Author Info

  • Michele Mosca

    (Università di Napoli Federico II)

  • Francesco Pastore

    (Seconda Università di Napoli)

Abstract

This essay analyses the role of different recruitment channels, and of informal networks in particular, on wage structures across various organization types in the Italian social service sector. While the impact of recruitment methods on wages has been addressed in several previous contributions, none of them focuses on social services. Comparison of outcomes across organization types within the same sector is in itself another novelty, as compared to previous studies that generally focus on differences across sectors or, more recently, across countries. The main findings are that nonprofit organizations prefer informal recruitment methods to better select the most motivated workers, namely those workers who share the nonprofit mission. Furthermore the impact of informal contacts on the wage structure explains much of the unobserved wage differentials across organization type.

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This chapter was published in:

  • Marco Musella & Sergio Destefanis (ed.), 2009. "Paid and Unpaid Labour in the Social Economy. An International Perspective," AIEL Series in Labour Economics, AIEL - Associazione Italiana Economisti del Lavoro, number 03.
    This item is provided by AIEL - Associazione Italiana Economisti del Lavoro in its series AIEL Series in Labour Economics with number 03-08.

    Handle: RePEc:ail:chapts:03-08

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    Web page: http://www.aiel.it/
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    Related research

    Keywords: recruitment channels; informal networks; wage structure; Italian third sector.;

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    Cited by:
    1. Oyer, Paul & Schaefer, Scott, 2011. "Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives," Handbook of Labor Economics, Elsevier.

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