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Co-Worker Complemetarity and the Stability of Top Management Teams

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  • Rachel M. Hayes
  • Paul Oyer
  • Scott Schaefer

Abstract

We investigate the hypothesis that complementarities across co-workers (which may arise from matching or investments in specific skills) affect the value of employment relationships between senior executives and firms. We analyze the changes in the composition of top management teams when a key member of the team (the CEO) departs. Our empirical analysis establishes several facts that are consistent with co-worker complementarity being an important determinant of management team stability.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 10350.

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Date of creation: Mar 2004
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Publication status: published as Hayes, Rachel M., Paul Oyer and Scott Schaefer. "Coworker Complementarity Of The Stability Of Top-Management Teams," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, 2006, v22(1,Apr), 184-212.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10350

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Edward P. Lazear, 1995. "Personnel Economics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121883, December.
  2. Robert S. Huckman & Jason Barro, 2005. "Cohort Turnover and Productivity: The July Phenomenon in Teaching Hospitals," NBER Working Papers 11182, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Augustin Landier & Julien Sauvagnat & David Sraer & David Thesmar, 2013. "Bottom-Up Corporate Governance," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, European Finance Association, vol. 17(1), pages 161-201.
  4. Mas, Alexandre & Moretti, Enrico, 2006. "Peers at Work," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 5870, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Oyer, Paul & Schaefer, Scott, 2011. "Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives," Handbook of Labor Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier.
  6. Hadem, Michael, 2010. "Bedingungen und Konsequenzen des Wechsels von Finanzvorständen - Eine Analyse in großen börsennotierten Unternehmen," EconStor Theses, ZBW - German National Library of Economics, number 43681.
  7. Anthony Marino & Jan Zabojnik, 2006. "Work-Related Perks, Agency Problems, and Optimal Incentive Contracts," Working Papers, Queen's University, Department of Economics 1107, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  8. Stefan Hilger & Ansgar Richter & Utz Schaeffer, 2013. "Hanging Together, Together Hung? Career Implications of Interpersonal Ties Between CEOs and Top Managers," BuR - Business Research, German Academic Association for Business Research, German Academic Association for Business Research, vol. 6(1), pages 8-32, May.
  9. Ann Bartel & Brianna Cardiff-Hicks & Kathryn Shaw, 2013. "Compensation Matters: Incentives for Multitasking in a Law Firm," NBER Working Papers 19412, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. Paul Oyer & Scott Schaefer, 2012. "Firm/Employee Matching: An Industry Study of American Lawyers," NBER Working Papers 18620, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Paul Oyer, 2006. "The Macro-Foundations of Microeconomics: Initial Labor Market Conditions and Long-Term Outcomes for Economists," NBER Working Papers 12157, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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