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The antecedents of simultaneous appointments to CEO and Chair

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  • Wallace Davidson
  • Yixi Ning
  • David Rakowski
  • Eahab Elsaid

Abstract

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  • Wallace Davidson & Yixi Ning & David Rakowski & Eahab Elsaid, 2008. "The antecedents of simultaneous appointments to CEO and Chair," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 12(4), pages 381-401, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:jmgtgv:v:12:y:2008:i:4:p:381-401
    DOI: 10.1007/s10997-008-9066-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Olubunmi Faleye, 2007. "Does one hat fit all? The case of corporate leadership structure," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 11(3), pages 239-259, September.
    3. Catherine M. Daily & Dan R. Dalton, 1997. "Separate, But Not Independent: Board Leadership Structure in Large Corporations," Corporate Governance: An International Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(3), pages 126-136, July.
    4. Alfred D. Chandler, 1969. "Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the American Industrial Enterprise," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262530090, December.
    5. Michael C. Jensen, 2010. "The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems," Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 22(1), pages 43-58, January.
    6. Denis, David J. & Denis, Diane K. & Sarin, Atulya, 1997. "Ownership structure and top executive turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 193-221, August.
    7. Parrino, Robert, 1997. "CEO turnover and outside succession A cross-sectional analysis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 165-197, November.
    8. Barber, Brad M. & Lyon, John D., 1996. "Detecting abnormal operating performance: The empirical power and specification of test statistics," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 359-399, July.
    9. McWilliams, Victoria B. & Sen, Nilanjan, 1997. "Board Monitoring and Antitakeover Amendments," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 32(4), pages 491-505, December.
    10. Warner, Jerold B. & Watts, Ross L. & Wruck, Karen H., 1988. "Stock prices and top management changes," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 461-492, January.
    11. Wallace N. Davidson III & Carol Nemec & Dan L. Worrell, 2001. "Succession planning vs. agency theory: a test of Harris and Helfat's interpretation of plurality announcement market returns," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(2), pages 179-184, February.
    12. Borokhovich, Kenneth A. & Parrino, Robert & Trapani, Teresa, 1996. "Outside Directors and CEO Selection," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 31(3), pages 337-355, September.
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    14. Goyal, Vidhan K. & Park, Chul W., 2002. "Board leadership structure and CEO turnover," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 49-66, January.
    15. Catherine M. Daily & Dan R. Dalton, 1993. "Board of Directors Leadership and Structure: Control and Performance Implications," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 17(3), pages 65-81, April.
    16. Brickley, James A. & Coles, Jeffrey L. & Jarrell, Gregg, 1997. "Leadership structure: Separating the CEO and Chairman of the Board," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 189-220, June.
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    19. Brickley, James A., 2003. "Empirical research on CEO turnover and firm-performance: a discussion," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1-3), pages 227-233, December.
    20. Dan L. Worrell & Carol Nemec & Wallace N. Davidson Iii, 1997. "One Hat Too Many: Key Executive Plurality And Shareholder Wealth," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(6), pages 499-507, June.
    21. Wallace Davidson & Carol Nemec & Dan Worrell & Jun Lin, 2002. "Industrial Origin of CEOs in Outside Succession: Board Preference and Stockholder Reaction," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 6(4), pages 295-321, December.
    22. Rajeswararao S. Chaganti & Vijay Mahajan & Subhash Sharma, 1985. "Corporate Board Size, Composition And Corporate Failures In Retailing Industry[1]," Journal of Management Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(4), pages 400-417, July.
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    24. Catherine M. Daily & Dan R. Dalton, 1995. "CEO and director turnover in failing firms: An illusion of change?," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(5), pages 393-400.
    25. Denis, David J & Denis, Diane K, 1995. "Performance Changes Following Top Management Dismissals," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 50(4), pages 1029-1057, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Pieter-Jan Bezemer & Stefan Peij & Gregory Maassen & Han Halder, 2012. "The changing role of the supervisory board chairman: the case of the Netherlands (1997–2007)," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 16(1), pages 37-55, February.
    2. Michael Firth & Sonia Wong & Yong Yang, 2014. "The double-edged sword of CEO/chairperson duality in corporatized state-owned firms: evidence from top management turnover in China," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 18(1), pages 207-244, February.
    3. Maurizio La Rocca & Francesco Fasano & Tiziana La Rocca & Neha Neha, 2024. "Women in CEO duality and firm performance in Europe," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 28(1), pages 177-214, March.

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