Top Executives, Turnover and Firm Performance in Germany
AbstractThis paper examines executive turnover -- both for management and supervisory boards - - and its relation to firm performance in the largest companies in Germany in the 1980s. The management board turns over slowly -- at a rate of 10% per year -- implying that top executives in Germany have longer tenures than their counterparts in the U.S. and Japan. Turnover of the management board increases significantly with stock performance and particularly poor (i.e. negative) earnings, but is unrelated to sales growth and earnings growth. Turnover of the supervisory board is not consistently related to any measure of performance.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 4416.
Date of creation: Aug 1993
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- Kaplan, Steven N, 1994. "Top Executives, Turnover, and Firm Performance in Germany," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(1), pages 142-59, April.
- Steven N Kaplan, 1994. "Top Executives, Turnover and Firm Performance in Germany," CEPR Financial Markets Paper 0045, European Science Foundation Network in Financial Markets, c/o C.E.P.R, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 1988. "The Determinants of Board Composition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(4), pages 589-606, Winter.
- Steven Kaplan & Bernadette Minton, 1994. "'Outside' Intervention in Japanese Companies: Its Determinants and Implications for Mangers," NBER Working Papers 4276, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hoshi, Takeo & Kashyap, Anil & Scharfstein, David, 1991.
"Corporate Structure, Liquidity, and Investment: Evidence from Japanese Industrial Groups,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 106(1), pages 33-60, February.
- Takeo Hoshi & Anil Kashyap & David Scharfstein, 1989. "Corporate structure, liquidity, and investment: evidence from Japanese industrial groups," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 82, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Grundfest, Joseph A., 1990. "Subordination of American capital," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 89-114, September.
- Steven N. Kaplan, 1994. "Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and the U.S," NBER Working Papers 4065, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
This item has more than 25 citations. To prevent cluttering this page, these citations are listed on a separate page. reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.