Pay, Performance, and Turnover of Bank CEOs
AbstractA new data set covers chief executive officers (CEOs) of large commercial banks over the period 1982-87. For newly hired CEOs, the elasticity of pay with respect to assets is about one-third. For continuing CEOs, the change in compensation depends on performance, as measured by stock and accounting returns. The sensitivity of pay to performance diminishes with experience, but the returns are not filtered for peer-group returns. Logit regressions relate the probability of CEO departure to age and performance, as measured by stock returns filtered for peer-group returns; CEO experience does not influence this relationship.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Harvard University Department of Economics in its series Scholarly Articles with number 3451300.
Date of creation: 1990
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of Labor Economics
Other versions of this item:
- Barro, Jason R & Barro, Robert J, 1990. "Pay, Performance, and Turnover of Bank CEOs," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 8(4), pages 448-81, October.
- Jason R. Barro & Robert J. Barro, 1990. "Pay, Performance, and Turnover of Bank CEOs," NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc 3262, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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