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Executive Pay and Performance: Evidence from the U.S. Banking Industry

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Author Info
R. Glenn Hubbard
Darius Palia

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Abstract

This paper examines an effect of deregulating the market for corporate control on CEO compensation in the banking industry. Given that each state's banking regulation defines the competitiveness of its corporate control market, we examine the effect of a state's interstate banking regulation on the level and structure of bank CEO compensation. Using panel data on 147 banks over the decade of the 1980s, we find evidence supporting the hypothesis that competitive corporate control markets (i.e., where interstate banking is permitted) require talented managers whose levels of compensation are higher. We also find that the compensation-performance relationship is stronger than for managers in markets where interstate banking is not permitted. Further, CEO turnover increases substantially after deregulation, as does the proportion in performance-related compensation. These results suggest strong evidence of a managerial talent market -- that is, one which matches the level and structure of compensation with the competitiveness of the banking environment.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 4704.

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Date of creation: Oct 1995
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:4704

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G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Barro, Jason R & Barro, Robert J, 1990. "Pay, Performance, and Turnover of Bank CEOs," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 8(4), pages 448-81, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Sherwin Rosen, 1990. "Contracts and the Market for Executives," NBER Working Papers 3542, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Smith, Clifford Jr. & Watts, Ross L., 1992. "The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 263-292, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Ciscel, David H & Carroll, Thomas M, 1980. "The Determinants of Executive Salaries: An Econometric Survey," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 62(1), pages 7-13, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Joskow, Paul L. & Rose, Nancy L. & Shepard, Andrea., 1993. "Regulatory constraints on executive compensation," Working papers 3550-93., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management. [Downloadable!]
  6. Hausman, Jerry A. & Taylor, William E., 1981. "Panel data and unobservable individual effects," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 155-155, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Hausman, Jerry A & Taylor, William E, 1981. "Panel Data and Unobservable Individual Effects," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(6), pages 1377-98, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Warner, Jerold B. & Watts, Ross L. & Wruck, Karen H., 1988. "Stock prices and top management changes," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 461-492, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Weisbach, Michael S., 1988. "Outside directors and CEO turnover," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 431-460, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Breusch, T S & Pagan, A R, 1980. "The Lagrange Multiplier Test and Its Applications to Model Specification in Econometrics," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 47(1), pages 239-53, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 1988. "The Determinants of Board Composition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(4), pages 589-606, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Black, Fischer & Scholes, Myron S, 1973. "The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(3), pages 637-54, May-June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Jensen, Michael C & Murphy, Kevin J, 1990. "Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 225-64, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Rosen, S., 1990. "Contracts and Market for Executives," University of Chicago - Economics Research Center 90-12, Chicago - Economics Research Center.
  15. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1988. "Value Maximization and the Acquisition Process," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 7-20, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Abigail Wozniak, 2006. "Product Markets and Paychecks: Deregulation's Effect on the Compensation Structure in Banking," IZA Discussion Papers 1957, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Rebel A. Cole & Hamid Mehran, 1996. "The effect of changes in ownership structure on performance: evidence from the thrift industry," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 96-6, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Charles W. Calomiris & Thanavut Pornrojnangkool, 2005. "Monopoly-Creating Bank Consolidation? The Merger of Fleet and BankBoston," NBER Working Papers 11351, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Mark M. Suazo, . "Implications of the Affective Response to Psychological Contract Breach," Working Papers 0028, College of Business, University of Texas at San Antonio. [Downloadable!]
  5. Fredric S. Mishkin & Philip E. Strahan, 1999. "What Will Technology Do to Financial Structure?," NBER Working Papers 6892, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Natália Pimenta Monteiro, 2004. "Regulatory reform and the Portuguese banking labour market: two decades later," NIPE Working Papers 10/2004, NIPE - Universidade do Minho. [Downloadable!]
  7. Vicente Cuñat & María Guadalupe, 2005. "How Does Product Market Competition Shape Incentive Contracts?," CEP Discussion Papers dp0687, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Rebecca S. Demsetz & Marc R. Saidenberg, 1999. "Looking beyond the CEO: executive compensation at banks," Staff Reports 68, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
  9. Stelios Michalopoulos & Luc Laeven & Ross Levine, 2009. "Financial Innovation and Endogenous Growth," NBER Working Papers 15356, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Rafael Gomez & Konstantinos Tzioumis, 2006. "What Do Unions Do to CEO Compensation?," CEP Discussion Papers dp0720, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  11. Jith Jayaratne & Philip E. Strahan, 1996. "Entry restrictions, industry evolution and dynamic efficiency: evidence from commercial banking," Research Paper 9630, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
  12. David Nash, 2003. "Determinants of the use of financial incentives in investment banking," ESRC Centre for Business Research - Working Papers wp256, ESRC Centre for Business Research. [Downloadable!]
  13. Paul L. Joskow & Nancy L. Rose, 1994. "CEO Pay and Firm Performance: Dynamics, Asymmetries, and Alternative Performance Measures," NBER Working Papers 4976, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Vives, Xavier, 2006. "Innovation and competitive pressure," IESE Research Papers D/634, IESE Business School.
    Other versions:
  15. Philip E. Strahan, 2003. "The real effects of U.S. banking deregulation," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jul, pages 111-128. [Downloadable!]
  16. Stephen Prowse, 1995. "Alternative methods of corporate control in commercial banks," Working Papers 95-07, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. [Downloadable!]
  17. Sandra E. Black & Philip E. Strahan, 2001. "The Division of Spoils: Rent-Sharing and Discrimination in a Regulated Industry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(4), pages 814-831, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. John S. Jordan, 1997. "Manager's opportunistic trading of their firms' shares: a case study of executives in the banking industry," Working Papers 97-4, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston. [Downloadable!]
  19. Ross Levine & Alexey Levkov & Yona Rubinstein, 2008. "Racial Discrimination and Competition," NBER Working Papers 14273, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Levine, Ross, 2009. "Finance and inequality : theory and evidence," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4967, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  21. Jith Jayaratne & Philip E. Strahan, 1997. "Entry restrictions, industry evolution, and dynamic efficiency: evidence from commercial banking," Staff Reports 22, Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [Downloadable!]
  22. Rüdiger Fahlenbrach & René M. Stulz, 2009. "Bank CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis," NBER Working Papers 15212, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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