Top Executives, Turnover and Firm Performance in Germany
AbstractThis paper examines executive turnover -- both for management and supervisory boards -- and its relation to firm performance in the largest companies in Germany in the 1980s. Turnover of the management board increases significantly with poor stock performance and particularly poor (i.e. negative) earnings, but is unrelated to sales growth and earnings growth. These turnover- performance relations do not vary with measures of stock ownership and bank voting power. Supervisory board appointments and turnover also increase with poor stock performance, but are unrelated to other measures of performance.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by European Science Foundation Network in Financial Markets, c/o C.E.P.R, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ in its series CEPR Financial Markets Paper with number 0045.
Date of creation: Jan 1994
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Other versions of this item:
- Kaplan, Steven N, 1994. "Top Executives, Turnover, and Firm Performance in Germany," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(1), pages 142-59, April.
- Steven N. Kaplan, 1993. "Top Executives, Turnover and Firm Performance in Germany," NBER Working Papers 4416, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Steven N. Kaplan, 1992. "Top Executive Rewards and Firm Performance: A Comparison of Japan and the U.S," NBER Working Papers 4065, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hoshi, Takeo & Kashyap, Anil & Scharfstein, David, 1991.
"Corporate Structure, Liquidity, and Investment: Evidence from Japanese Industrial Groups,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
MIT Press, vol. 106(1), pages 33-60, February.
- Takeo Hoshi & Anil Kashyap & David Scharfstein, 1989. "Corporate structure, liquidity, and investment: evidence from Japanese industrial groups," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 82, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Stephen D. Prowse, 1990. "Institutional investment patterns and corporate financial behavior in the U.S. and Japan," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 108, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Steven Kaplan & Bernadette Minton, 1993. "'Outside' Intervention in Japanese Companies: Its Determinants and Implications for Mangers," NBER Working Papers 4276, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 1988. "The Determinants of Board Composition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(4), pages 589-606, Winter.
- Grundfest, Joseph A., 1990. "Subordination of American capital," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 89-114, September.
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