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The Labor Market Effects of Employer Recruitment Choice

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  • Jed DeVaro

    (Cornell University)

Abstract

I estimate a structural model of employer recruitment choice using data from the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality (MCSUI), a 1992-1995 cross-sectional survey of employers and households in four metropolitan areas of the United States. I then conduct policy simulations to predict the effects of “information” policies such as the Workforce Investment Act of 1998 and “hiring incentive” policies such as the Welfare-to-Work and Work Opportunity tax credits. I find that the tax credits are superior to the information policy, both in improving placement rates for the low-skilled worker groups they target, and in increasing the starting wage distribution for these workers.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Labor and Demography with number 0508006.

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Date of creation: 08 Aug 2005
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Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpla:0508006

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References

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  1. Jed Devaro, 2005. "Employer Recruitment Strategies and the Labor Market Outcomes of New Hires," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 43(2), pages 263-282, April.
  2. James Albrecht & Pieter Gautier, 2004. "Equilibrium Directed Search with Multiple Applications," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 330, Econometric Society.
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Cited by:
  1. Jed DeVaro & Michael Waldman, 2012. "The Signaling Role of Promotions: Further Theory and Empirical Evidence," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 91 - 147.
  2. Pinoli, Sara, 2007. "Employment Protection and Labor Productivity: Positive or Negative?," MPRA Paper 11775, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Paul Oyer & Scott Schaefer, 2010. "Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives," NBER Working Papers 15977, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Manant, Matthieu & Pajak, Serge & Soulié, Nicolas, 2014. "Do recruiters 'like' it? Online social networks and privacy in hiring: a pseudo-randomized experiment," MPRA Paper 56845, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  5. repec:hal:cesptp:halshs-00971684 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Sylvie Blasco & Barbara Pertold-Gebicka, 2012. "Employment Policies, Hiring Practices and Firm Performance," Working Papers 2012-27, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
  7. Pinoli, Sara, 2008. "Screening ex-ante or screening on-the-job? The impact of the employment contract," MPRA Paper 11429, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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