Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Wage Effects of Recruitment Methods: The Case of the Italian Social Service Sector

Contents:

Author Info

  • Mosca, Michele

    ()
    (University of Naples Federico II)

  • Pastore, Francesco

    ()
    (University of Naples II)

Abstract

This paper uses a unique data set containing detailed micro-information on organisations, managers, workers and volunteers belonging to public, private forprofit and private nonprofit institutions delivering social services in Italy. The analysis aims to estimate the determinants of wages across organisations at a sector level focusing on the role of hiring and job search methods, including informal networks. We find that, independent of the organisation type, being hired through public competitions brings with it a substantial wage premium (ranging from 7 to 32%). Informal networks bring with them a wage penalty (-6.5%) in the state sector, where formal hiring methods are common, and a wage premium (6.3%) in social cooperatives and religious institutions, where formal hiring methods are not common. Interestingly, the differences in hiring and in job search methods between state and private organisations explain from 50% to 100% of the conditional wage differentials across organisation types. Our interpretation of these findings is that nonprofit organisations prefer informal recruitment methods not for nepotistic reasons, but to better select the most motivated workers, those who share the nonprofit mission. This paper adds to the previous literature by suggesting that in addition to lower than average monetary compensations, informal recruitment methods are part of the process of self-selection of motivated workers in nonprofit organisations.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://ftp.iza.org/dp3422.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 3422.

as in new window
Length: 51 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2008
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in: Sergio Destefanis and Marco Musella (eds.), Paid and Unpaid Labour in Social Utility Services, Heidelberg: Physica Verlag, 2009
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3422

Contact details of provider:
Postal: IZA, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
Phone: +49 228 3894 223
Fax: +49 228 3894 180
Web page: http://www.iza.org

Order Information:
Postal: IZA, Margard Ody, P.O. Box 7240, D-53072 Bonn, Germany
Email:

Related research

Keywords: social services; Italy; earnings functions; informal networks; nonprofit organisations;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Samuel Bentolila & Claudio Michelacci & Javier Suarez, 2010. "Social Contacts and Occupational Choice," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 77(305), pages 20-45, 01.
  2. Mosca, Michele & Musella, Marco & Pastore, Francesco, 2006. "Relational Goods, Monitoring and Non-Pecuniary Compensations in the Nonprofit Sector: The Case of the Italian Social Services," IZA Discussion Papers 2254, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  3. Maarten Goos & Anna Salomons, 2007. "Dangerous liaisons: a social network model for the gender wage gap," Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers ces0722, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën.
  4. Harry J. Holzer, 1986. "Search Method Use by Unemployed Youth," NBER Working Papers 1859, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Psacharopoulos, George, 1994. "Returns to investment in education: A global update," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 22(9), pages 1325-1343, September.
  6. Linda Loury, 2006. "Job Search Among Informal Contacts," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 0604, Department of Economics, Tufts University.
  7. Calvó-Armengol, Antoni & Zenou, Yves, 2001. "Job Matching, Social Network and Word-of-Mouth Communication," Seminar Papers 695, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
  8. Simon, Curtis J & Warner, John T, 1992. "Matchmaker, Matchmaker: The Effect of Old Boy Networks on Job Match Quality, Earnings, and Tenure," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 10(3), pages 306-30, July.
  9. Michele Pellizzari, 2004. "Do Friends and Relatives Really Help in Getting a Good Job?," CEP Discussion Papers dp0623, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  10. Gregg, Paul & Wadsworth, Jonathan, 1996. "How Effective Are State Employment Agencies? Jobcentre Use and Job Matching in Britain," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 58(3), pages 443-67, August.
  11. Carlos Pestana Barros, 2006. "Earnings, Schooling and Social Capital of Cooperative Managers," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 77(1), pages 1-20, 03.
  12. Jonathan M. Thomas, 1997. "Public employment agencies and unemployment spells: Reconciling the experimental and nonexperimental evidence," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 50(4), pages 667-683, July.
  13. Goddeeris, John H, 1988. "Compensating Differentials and Self-selection: An Application to Lawyers," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(2), pages 411-28, April.
  14. Matt Jackson, 2003. "The Effects of Social Networks on Employment and Inequality," Theory workshop papers 658612000000000032, UCLA Department of Economics.
  15. Eric Delattre & Mareva Sabatier, 2007. "Social Capital and Wages: An Econometric Evaluation of Social Networking's Effects," LABOUR, CEIS, vol. 21(2), pages 209-236, 06.
  16. Goldberg, Matthew S, 1982. "Discrimination, Nepotism, and Long-Run Wage Differentials," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 97(2), pages 307-19, May.
  17. Cahuc, Pierre & Fontaine, François, 2002. "On the Efficiency of Job Search with Social Networks," CEPR Discussion Papers 3511, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  18. Antoninis, Manos, 2006. "The wage effects from the use of personal contacts as hiring channels," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 133-146, January.
  19. Harry J. Holzer, 1987. "Job search by employed and unemployed youth," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 40(4), pages 601-611, July.
  20. Bull, Clive & Ornati, Oscar & Tedeschi, Piero, 1987. "Search, Hiring Strategies, and Labor Market Intermediaries," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 5(4), pages S1-17, October.
  21. Linda Datcher Loury, 2006. "Some Contacts Are More Equal than Others: Informal Networks, Job Tenure, and Wages," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(2), pages 299-318, April.
  22. Francesco Pastore, 2009. "School-to-Work Transitions in Mongolia," European Journal of Comparative Economics, Cattaneo University (LIUC), vol. 6(2), pages 245-264, December.
  23. Concetta, MENDOLICCHIO, 2006. "A Disaggregate Analysis of Private Returns to Education in Italy," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2006054, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
  24. Oaxaca, Ronald L. & Ransom, Michael R., 1994. "On discrimination and the decomposition of wage differentials," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 5-21, March.
  25. Mortensen, D. T. & Vishwanath, T., 1995. "Personal contacts and earnings: It is who you know!," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(1), pages 103-104, March.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Paul Oyer & Scott Schaefer, 2010. "Personnel Economics: Hiring and Incentives," NBER Working Papers 15977, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp3422. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mark Fallak).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.