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Employee Sentiment and Stock Option Compensation

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Author Info
Nittai K. Bergman
Dirk Jenter

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Abstract

The use of equity-based compensation for employees in the lower ranks of large organizations is a puzzle for standard economic theory: undiversified employees should discount company equity heavily, and any positive incentive effects should be diminished by free rider problems. We analyze whether the popularity of option compensation for rank and file employees may be driven by employee optimism. We develop a model of optimal compensation policy for a firm faced with employees with positive or negative sentiment, and explicitly take into account that current and potential employees are able to purchase equity in the firm through the stock market. We show that employee optimism by itself is insufficient to make equity compensation optimal for the firm. Any behavioral explanation for equity compensation based on employee optimism requires two ingredients: first, employees need be over-optimistic about firm value, and second, firms must be able to extract part of the implied rents even though employees can purchase company equity in the market. Such rent extraction becomes feasible if employees prefer the non-traded compensation options offered by firms to the traded equity offered by the market, or if the traded equity is overvalued. We then provide empirical evidence confirming that firms use broad-based option compensation when boundedly rational employees are likely to be excessively optimistic about company stock, and when employees are likely to have a strict preference for options over stock.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 11409.

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Date of creation: Jun 2005
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11409

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Paul Oyer & Scott Schaefer, 2004. "Why Do Some Firms Give Stock Options to All Employees?: An Empirical Examination of Alternative Theories," NBER Working Papers 10222, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Inderst, Roman & Mueller, Holger M, 2005. "Benefits of Broad-based Option Pay," CEPR Discussion Papers 4878, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Paul Oyer & Scott Schaefer, 2004. "Compensating Employees Below the Executive Ranks: A Comparison of Options, Restricted Stock, and Cash," NBER Working Papers 10221, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Oyer, Paul & Schaefer, Scott, 2005. "Accounting, Governance, and Broad-Based Stock Option Grants," Research Papers 1821r1, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. [Downloadable!]
  5. Illoong Kwon & Katherine Guthrie & Jan Sokolowsky, 2008. "On the Objective of Corporate Boards: Theory and Evidence," Discussion Papers 08-08, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Zhang, Ge, 2004. "Market valuation and employee stock options," Working Papers 2003-13, University of New Orleans, Department of Economics and Finance. [Downloadable!]
  7. Chhaochharia, Vidhi & Laeven, Luc, 2008. "Sovereign Wealth Funds: Their Investment Strategies and Performance," CEPR Discussion Papers 6959, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Malcolm Baker & Joshua Coval & Jeremy C. Stein, 2004. "Corporate Financing Decisions When Investors Take the Path of Least Resistance," NBER Working Papers 10998, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Kevin F. Hallock & Craig Olson, 2006. "The Value of Stock Options to Non-Executive Employees," NBER Working Papers 11950, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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