This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Managerial Leverage Is Limited by the Extent of the Market: Hierarchies, Specialization, and the Utilization of Lawyers' Human Capital

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Garicano, Luis
Hubbard, Thomas N

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

This paper examines the role of hierarchies in the organization of human-capital-intensive production. We develop an equilibrium model of hierarchical organization and provide empirical evidence based on confidential data on thousands of law offices. The equilibrium assignment of individuals to hierarchical positions varies with the degree of field specialization, which increases as the extent of the market increases. As individuals' knowledge becomes narrower but deeper, managerial leverage--the number of workers per manager--optimally increases to exploit this depth. Consistent with our model, the share of lawyers who work in hierarchies and the ratio of associates to partners increase as market size increases and lawyers field specialize. Other results provide evidence against alternative interpretations that emphasize unobserved differences in the distribution of demand, or firm-size effects, and lend additional support to the view that, in legal services, hierarchies help exploit increasing returns associated with the utilization of human capital.

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Law and Economics.

Volume (Year): 50 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 1-43
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlawec:y:2007:v:50:i:1:p:1-43

Contact details of provider:
Postal: The University of Chicago Press, Journals Division, P.O. Box 37005 Chicago, IL 60637
Fax: (773) 753-0811
Email:
Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLE/

Order Information:
Web: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JLE/order1.html

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Romer, Paul M, 1986. "Increasing Returns and Long-run Growth," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(5), pages 1002-37, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi Zingales, 1998. "Power In A Theory Of The Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(2), pages 387-432, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Rebitzer, James B, 1993. "Radical Political Economy and the Economics of Labor Markets," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 31(3), pages 1394-434, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Roy Radner & Timothy Van Zandt, 1992. "Information Processing in Firms and Returns to Scale," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ADRES, issue 25-26, pages 15, Janvier-J. [Downloadable!]
  5. Van Zandt, Timothy, 1999. "Real-Time Decentralized Information Processing as a Model of Organizations with Boundedly Rational Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(3), pages 633-58, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Sherwin Rosen, 1982. "Authority, Control, and the Distribution of Earnings," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 13(2), pages 311-323, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Radner, Roy, 1993. "The Organization of Decentralized Information Processing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(5), pages 1109-46, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Raghuram Rajan & Julie Wulf, 2003. "The Flattening Firm: Evidence from Panel Data on the Changing Nature of Corporate Hierarchies," NBER Working Papers 9633, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Qian, Yingyi, 1994. "Incentives and Loss of Control in an Optimal Hierarchy," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 61(3), pages 527-44, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Luis Garicano & Thomas Hubbard, 2009. "Earnings Inequality and Coordination Costs: Evidence From U.S. Law Firms," NBER Working Papers 14741, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Fredrik Andersson & Matthew Freedman & John C. Haltiwanger & Julia Lane & Kathryn L. Shaw, 2006. "Reaching for the Stars: Who Pays for Talent in Innovative Industries?," NBER Working Papers 12435, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Andrew Epstein & Jonathan D. Ketcham & Sean Nicholson, 2008. "Professional Partnerships and Matching in Obstetrics," NBER Working Papers 14070, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. James B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor, 2006. "When Knowledge Is an Asset: Explaining the Organizational Structure of Large Law Firms," IZA Discussion Papers 2353, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Hoyt Bleakley & Jeffrey Lin, 2007. "Thick-market effects and churning in the labor market: evidence from U.S. cities," Working Papers 07-23, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. [Downloadable!]
  6. Rosario Crino, 2006. "Are U.S. White-Collar Really at Risk of Service Offshoring?," CESPRI Working Papers 183, CESPRI, Centre for Research on Innovation and Internationalisation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy, revised Oct 2006. [Downloadable!]
  7. Nick Bloom & Raffaella Sadun & John Van Reenen, 2009. "The Organization of Firms Across Countries," CEP Discussion Papers dp0937, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Rob Simmons & D Berri, 2007. "Does it pay to specialize? The story from the Gridiron," Working Papers 005290, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Want to help out with this project? Look for volunteer opportunities.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-16.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.