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Up-or-Out Contracts: A Signaling Perspective

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Michael Waldman (UCLA)

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File URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp556.pdf
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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series UCLA Economics Working Papers with number 556.

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Date of creation: 01 Apr 1989
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Handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:556

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Web page: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/

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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Harris, Milton & Holstrom, Bengt, 1982. "A Theory of Wage Dynamics," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 49(3), pages 315-33, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Milgrom, Paul & Oster, Sharon, 1987. "Job Discrimination, Market Forces, and the Invisibility Hypothesis," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(3), pages 453-76, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Novos, I.E., 1988. "Worker Preferences And Firm Structure," Papers m8821, Southern California - Department of Economics.
  4. Michael Waldman, 1984. "Job Assignments, Signalling, and Efficiency," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 255-267, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Kahn, Charles & Huberman, Gur, 1988. "Two-sided Uncertainty and "Up-or-Out" Contracts," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 6(4), pages 423-44, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Edward P. Lazear, 1984. "Raids and Offermatching," NBER Working Papers 1419, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Prescott, Edward C & Visscher, Michael, 1980. "Organization Capital," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(3), pages 446-61, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. MacDonald, Glenn M, 1982. "A Market Equilibrium Theory of Job Assignment and Sequential Accumulation of Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 1038-55, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Ricart i Costa, Joan E, 1988. "Managerial Task Assignment and Promotions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 449-66, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Khovanskaya, Irina & Sonin, Konstantin & Yudkevich, Maria, 2008. "Budget Uncertainty and Faculty Contracts: A Dynamic Framework for Comparative Analysis," CEPR Discussion Papers 6744, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Jan Zabojnik, 2008. "Promotion Tournaments in Market Equilibrium," Working Papers 1193, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Cater, Bruce & Lew, Byron & Pivato, Marcus, 2009. "Why tenure?," MPRA Paper 14823, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  4. Sliwka, Dirk, 2004. "On the Notion of Responsibility in Organizations," IZA Discussion Papers 1423, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Heisz, Andrew & Oreopoulos, Philip, 2006. "Importance des signaux de compétence pour l'obtention d'un emploi et de l'avancement," Direction des études analytiques : documents de recherche 2006236f, Statistics Canada, Direction des études analytiques. [Downloadable!]
  6. Carolyn Pitchik & Aloysius Siow, 1997. "Self-Promoting Investments," Working Papers pitchik-97-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Robert Gibbons & Michael Waldman, 2003. "Enriching a Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms," NBER Working Papers 9849, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. James Malcomson & James W. Maw & Barry McCormick, 2002. "General Training by Firms, Apprentice Contracts, and Public Policy," Economics Series Working Papers 086, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. James B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor, 2006. "When Knowledge Is an Asset: Explaining the Organizational Structure of Large Law Firms," IZA Discussion Papers 2353, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Alexander K. Koch & Eloïc Peyrache, 2008. "Aligning Ambition and Incentives," Economics Working Papers 2008-16, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Heisz, Andrew & Oreopoulos, Philip, 2006. "The Importance of Signalling in Job Placement and Promotion," Analytical Studies Branch Research Paper Series 2006236e, Statistics Canada, Analytical Studies Branch. [Downloadable!]
  12. Dan Bernhardt & Steeve Mongrain, 2007. "The Layoff Rat Race," Discussion Papers dp07-06, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University. [Downloadable!]
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