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Up-or-Out Contracts: A Signaling Perspective Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Michael Waldman (UCLA)
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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series UCLA Economics Working Papers with number
556.
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Date of creation: 01 Apr 1989Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cla:uclawp:556Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: Harris, Milton & Holstrom, Bengt, 1982.
"A Theory of Wage Dynamics ,"
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Blackwell Publishing, vol. 49(3), pages 315-33, July.
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Other versions: Milgrom, Paul & Oster, Sharon, 1987.
"Job Discrimination, Market Forces, and the Invisibility Hypothesis ,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics ,
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Other versions: Novos, I.E., 1988.
"Worker Preferences And Firm Structure ,"
Papers
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Michael Waldman, 1984.
"Job Assignments, Signalling, and Efficiency ,"
RAND Journal of Economics ,
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Other versions: Kahn, Charles & Huberman, Gur, 1988.
"Two-sided Uncertainty and "Up-or-Out" Contracts ,"
Journal of Labor Economics ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 6(4), pages 423-44, October.
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Edward P. Lazear, 1984.
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NBER Working Papers
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Prescott, Edward C & Visscher, Michael, 1980.
"Organization Capital ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
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MacDonald, Glenn M, 1982.
"A Market Equilibrium Theory of Job Assignment and Sequential Accumulation of Information ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 1038-55, December.
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Ricart i Costa, Joan E, 1988.
"Managerial Task Assignment and Promotions ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 449-66, March.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Khovanskaya, Irina & Sonin, Konstantin & Yudkevich, Maria, 2008.
"Budget Uncertainty and Faculty Contracts: A Dynamic Framework for Comparative Analysis ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
6744, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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Other versions: Jan Zabojnik, 2008.
"Promotion Tournaments in Market Equilibrium ,"
Working Papers
1193, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
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Cater, Bruce & Lew, Byron & Pivato, Marcus, 2009.
"Why tenure? ,"
MPRA Paper
14823, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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Sliwka, Dirk, 2004.
"On the Notion of Responsibility in Organizations ,"
IZA Discussion Papers
1423, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
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Other versions: Heisz, Andrew & Oreopoulos, Philip, 2006.
"Importance des signaux de compétence pour l'obtention d'un emploi et de l'avancement ,"
Direction des études analytiques : documents de recherche
2006236f, Statistics Canada, Direction des études analytiques.
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Carolyn Pitchik & Aloysius Siow, 1997.
"Self-Promoting Investments ,"
Working Papers
pitchik-97-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
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Other versions:
Carolyn Pitchik, 2008.
"Self-Promoting Investments ,"
Working Papers
tecipa-312, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Carolyn Pitchik, 2006.
"Self-Promoting Investments ,"
Working Papers
tecipa-229, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Carolyn Pitchik, 2008.
"Self-Promoting Investments ,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) ,
Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 164(3), pages 381-406, September.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Robert Gibbons & Michael Waldman, 2003.
"Enriching a Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms ,"
NBER Working Papers
9849, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Other versions:
Gibbons, Robert & Waldman, Michael, 2003.
"Enriching a Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms ,"
Working papers
4324-03, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
[Downloadable!] Robert Gibbons & Michael Waldman, 2006.
"Enriching a Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics inside Firms ,"
Journal of Labor Economics ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(1), pages 59-108, January.
[Downloadable!] James Malcomson & James W. Maw & Barry McCormick, 2002.
"General Training by Firms, Apprentice Contracts, and Public Policy ,"
Economics Series Working Papers
086, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Malcomson, James M. & Maw, James W. & McCormick, Barry, 2002.
"General Training by Firms, Apprentice Contracts, and Public Policy ,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich.
[Downloadable!] Malcomson, J.M. & Maw, J.W. & McCormick, B., 2000.
"General Training by Firms, Apprentice Contracts, and Public Policy ,"
Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics
0021, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
Malcomson, James M. & Maw, James W. & McCormick, Barry, 2003.
"General training by firms, apprentice contracts, and public policy ,"
European Economic Review ,
Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 197-227, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) James B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor, 2006.
"When Knowledge Is an Asset: Explaining the Organizational Structure of Large Law Firms ,"
IZA Discussion Papers
2353, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
James B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor, 2006.
"When Knowledge is an Asset: Explaining the Organizational Structure of Large Law Firms ,"
NBER Working Papers
12583, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) James B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor, 2006.
"When Knowledge is an Asset: Explaining the Organizational Structure of Large Law Firms ,"
Economics Working Paper Archive
wp_477, Levy Economics Institute, The.
[Downloadable!] James B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor, 2007.
"When Knowledge Is an Asset: Explaining the Organizational Structure of Large Law Firms ,"
Journal of Labor Economics ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 25, pages 201-229.
[Downloadable!] Alexander K. Koch & Eloïc Peyrache, 2008.
"Aligning Ambition and Incentives ,"
Economics Working Papers
2008-16, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Koch, Alexander K. & Peyrache, Eloïc, 2005.
"Aligning Ambition and Incentives ,"
IZA Discussion Papers
1527, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
[Downloadable!] Alexander K. Koch & Eloic Peyrache, 2005.
"Aligning Ambition and Incentives ,"
Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics
05/03, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Mar 2005.
[Downloadable!] Heisz, Andrew & Oreopoulos, Philip, 2006.
"The Importance of Signalling in Job Placement and Promotion ,"
Analytical Studies Branch Research Paper Series
2006236e, Statistics Canada, Analytical Studies Branch.
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Dan Bernhardt & Steeve Mongrain, 2007.
"The Layoff Rat Race ,"
Discussion Papers
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