Managerial Task Assignment and Promotions
AbstractA two-period model of managerial task assignment is developed, where the current employer has the advantage of observing the actual performanc e of the manager, while outside employers can observe only the assign ments. Optimal contracts are rigid, but the market value of managers is below actual productivity and they are promoted less than is effic ient. The author introduces the idea of managers explo iting their information to separate themselves out in the market plac e. As a consequence, the model has the appealing property of small ab ility-based wage differentials within a task, as well as large ones b etween tasks. Copyright 1988 by The Econometric Society.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.
Volume (Year): 56 (1988)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
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