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Managerial Task Assignment and Promotions

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Author Info
Ricart i Costa, Joan E
Abstract

A two-period model of managerial task assignment is developed, where the current employer has the advantage of observing the actual performanc e of the manager, while outside employers can observe only the assign ments. Optimal contracts are rigid, but the market value of managers is below actual productivity and they are promoted less than is effic ient. The author introduces the idea of managers explo iting their information to separate themselves out in the market plac e. As a consequence, the model has the appealing property of small ab ility-based wage differentials within a task, as well as large ones b etween tasks. Copyright 1988 by The Econometric Society.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 56 (1988)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
Pages: 449-66
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:56:y:1988:i:2:p:449-66

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  1. Michael Waldman, 1990. "A Signalling Explanation for Seniority Based Promotions and Other Labor Market Puzzles," UCLA Economics Working Papers 599, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Heski Bar-Isaac & Ian Jewitt & Clare Leaver, 2007. "Information and Human Capital Managment," Working Papers 07-29, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  4. Heski Bar-Isaac & Mariagiovanna Baccara, 2006. "How to Organize Crime," Working Papers 06-07, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Kameshwari Shankar & Suman Ghosh, 2005. "Favorable Selection in the Labor Market: A Theory of Worker Mobility in R&D Intensive Industries," Working Papers 05006, Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University. [Downloadable!]
  6. Alberto Bayo-Moriones & Pedro Ortín-Ángel, 2003. "Internal promotion versus external recruitment: evidence in industrial plants," Working Papers 200303, Department of Business Economics, Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona. [Downloadable!]
  7. Guillermo Caruana & Marco Celentani, 2001. "Career Concerns And Contingent Compensation," Economics Working Papers we014811, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
  8. Lima, Francisco & Pereira, Pedro Telhado, 2001. "Careers and Wage Growth within Large Firms," IZA Discussion Papers 336, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  9. Alexander K. Koch & Eloïc Peyrache, 2005. "Tournaments, Individualized Contracts and Career Concerns," IZA Discussion Papers 1841, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  10. Lima, Francisco, 2000. "Internal labour markets: a case study," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp378, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia. [Downloadable!]
  11. Carolyn Pitchik & Aloysius Siow, 1997. "Self-Promoting Investments," Working Papers pitchik-97-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  12. Alexander K. Koch & Julia Nafziger, 2007. "Job Assignments under Moral Hazard: The Peter Principle Revisited," IZA Discussion Papers 2973, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  13. Alexander K. Koch & Eloic Peyrache, 2005. "Aligning Ambition and Incentives," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 05/03, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Mar 2005. [Downloadable!]
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  14. Robert Gibbons & Michael Waldman, 1998. "A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics in Internal Labor Markets," NBER Working Papers 6454, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Michael Waldman, 1989. "Up-or-Out Contracts: A Signaling Perspective," UCLA Economics Working Papers 556, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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