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Michael Waldman

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Personal Details

First Name: Michael
Middle Name:
Last Name: Waldman
Suffix:

RePEc Short-ID: pwa40

Email:
Homepage: http://www.gsm.cornell/facultybios/waldman.html
Postal Address: Michael Waldman Johnson Graduate School of Management Cornell University Sage Hall Ithaca, NY 14853
Phone: (607) 255-8631

Affiliation

(50%) Johnson Graduate School of Management
Cornell University
Location: Ithaca, New York (United States)
Homepage: http://www.johnson.cornell.edu/
Email:
Phone:
Fax: 607 255 1858
Postal:
Handle: RePEc:edi:gscorus (more details at EDIRC)
(50%) Department of Economics
Cornell University
Location: Ithaca, New York (United States)
Homepage: http://economics.cornell.edu/
Email:
Phone: 607-255-4254
Fax: 607-255-2818
Postal: Uris Hall, 4th Floor, Ithaca NY 14853
Handle: RePEc:edi:decorus (more details at EDIRC)

Works

as in new window

Working papers

  1. Valerie Smeets & Michael Waldman & Frederic Warzynski, 2013. "Performance, Career Dynamics, and Span of Control," Economics Working Papers 2013-02, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus.
  2. Waldman, Michael, 2013. "What Limits Indirect Appropriability?," MPRA Paper 44690, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  3. Michael Waldman & Sean Nicholson & Nodir Adilov, 2012. "Positive and Negative Mental Health Consequences of Early Childhood Television Watching," NBER Working Papers 17786, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 2008. "Safe Harbors for Quantity Discounts and Bundling," EAG Discussions Papers 200801, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.
  5. Dennis W. Carlton & Patrick Greenlee & Michael Waldman, 2008. "Assessing the Anticompetitive Effects of Multiproduct Pricing," NBER Working Papers 14199, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Waldman, Michael, 2007. "Theory and evidence in internal labor markets," MPRA Paper 5113, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Dennis W. Carlton & Joshua S. Gans & Michael Waldman, 2007. "Why Tie A Product Consumers Do Not Use?," NBER Working Papers 13339, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Suman Ghosh & Michael Waldman, 2006. "Standard Promotion Practices Versus Up-Or-Out Contracts," Working Papers 06007, Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University.
  9. Morita, Hodaka & Waldman, Michael, 2006. "Competition, Monopoly Maintenance, and Consumer Switching Costs," MPRA Paper 1426, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. Michael Waldman & Sean Nicholson & Nodir Adilov, 2006. "Does Television Cause Autism?," NBER Working Papers 12632, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  11. Adilov, Nodir & Waldman, Michael, 2006. "Optimal copyright length and ex post investment: a Mickey Mouse approach," MPRA Paper 1551, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  12. DeVaro, Jed & Waldman, Michael, 2006. "The signaling role of promotions: Further theory and empirical evidence," MPRA Paper 1550, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  13. Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 2005. "Tying, Upgrades, and Switching Costs in Durable-Goods Markets," NBER Working Papers 11407, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Suman Ghosh & Michael Waldman, 2004. "Standard Promotion Practices vs Up-Or-Out Contracts," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2004 132, Royal Economic Society.
  15. Michael Waldman, 2004. "Antitrust Perspectives for Durable-Goods Markets," CESifo Working Paper Series 1306, CESifo Group Munich.
  16. Robert Gibbons & Michael Waldman, 2003. "Enriching a Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms," NBER Working Papers 9849, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  17. Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 2001. "Competition, Monopoly, and Aftermarkets," NBER Working Papers 8086, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  18. Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 1998. "The Strategic Use Of Tying To Preserve And Create Market Power In Evolving Industries," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 145, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
  19. Robert Gibbons & Michael Waldman, 1998. "A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics in Internal Labor Markets," NBER Working Papers 6454, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  20. Oh, S. & Waldman, M., 1990. "Aggregate Fluctuations And False Announcements: The Role Of Expectations," Papers 30, California Los Angeles - Applied Econometrics.
  21. Michael Waldman, 1990. "A Signalling Explanation for Seniority Based Promotions and Other Labor Market Puzzles," UCLA Economics Working Papers 599, UCLA Department of Economics.
  22. Oh, S. & Waldman, M., 1990. "The Macroeconomic Effects Of False Announcements," Papers 17, California Los Angeles - Applied Econometrics.
  23. Michael Waldman, 1989. "Up-or-Out Contracts: A Signaling Perspective," UCLA Economics Working Papers 556, UCLA Department of Economics.
  24. Seonghwan Oh & Michael Waldman, 1989. "Keynesian Coordination Failure and Persistence," UCLA Economics Working Papers 570, UCLA Department of Economics.
  25. Seongwan Oh & Michael Waldman, 1989. "The New Perspective on Keynesian Coordination Failure: Theory and Evidence," UCLA Economics Working Papers 559, UCLA Department of Economics.
  26. Michael Waldman, 1988. "The Simple Case of Entry Deterrence Reconsidered," UCLA Economics Working Papers 517, UCLA Department of Economics.
  27. Michael Waldman, 1988. "What Would Darwin Say About Rational Expectations?," UCLA Economics Working Papers 478, UCLA Department of Economics.
  28. Neil Bruce & Michael Waldman, 1988. "Transfers in Kind: Why They Can Be Efficient and Non-Paternalistic," UCLA Economics Working Papers 532, UCLA Department of Economics.
  29. Michael Waldman, 1988. "Interpreting Evidence on Returns to Tenure: The Significance of Quasi-Specific Human Capital," UCLA Economics Working Papers 479, UCLA Department of Economics.
  30. Michael Waldman, 1987. "Underinvestment in Entry Deterrence: When and Why," UCLA Economics Working Papers 456, UCLA Department of Economics.
  31. Sule Ozler & Michael Waldman, 1987. "Border Enforcement Versus Internal Enforcement: A Study in the Economics of Illegal Migration," UCLA Economics Working Papers 443, UCLA Department of Economics.
  32. Ian E. Novos & Michael Waldman, 1986. "The Emergence of Copying Technologies: What Have We Learned," UCLA Economics Working Papers 408, UCLA Department of Economics.
  33. Neil Bruce & Michael Waldman, 1986. "The Rotten-Kid Theorem Meets the Samaritan's Dilemma," UCLA Economics Working Papers 402, UCLA Department of Economics.
  34. John Haltiwanger & Michael Waldman, 1986. "Limited Rationality and Synergism: The IMplications for Macroeconomics," UCLA Economics Working Papers 389, UCLA Department of Economics.
  35. Ian E. Novos & Michael Waldman, 1986. "Complementarity and Partial Nonexcludability: An Analysis of the Software/Computer Market," UCLA Economics Working Papers 403, UCLA Department of Economics.
  36. John Haltiwanger & Michael Waldman, 1986. "The Role of Altruism in Economic Interaction," UCLA Economics Working Papers 391, UCLA Department of Economics.
  37. John Haltiwanger & Michael Waldman, 1985. "The Pros and Cons of Renegotiation," UCLA Economics Working Papers 338, UCLA Department of Economics.
  38. Michael Waldman, 1985. "Noncooperative Entry Deterrence, Uncertainty, and the Free Rider Problem," UCLA Economics Working Papers 364, UCLA Department of Economics.
  39. Michael Waldman, 1985. "Information on Worker Ability: An Analysis of Inverstment Within the Firm," UCLA Economics Working Papers 375, UCLA Department of Economics.
  40. John Haltiwanger & Michael Waldman, 1985. "Insurance and Labor Market Contracting: An Analysis of the Capital Market Assumption," UCLA Economics Working Papers 370, UCLA Department of Economics.
  41. John Haltiwanger & Michael Waldman, 1985. "Rational Expectations in the Aggregate," UCLA Economics Working Papers 327, UCLA Department of Economics.
  42. John Haltiwanger & Michael Waldman, 1984. "Insurance Aspects of Labor Market Contracting: An Overview," UCLA Economics Working Papers 348, UCLA Department of Economics.
  43. Michael Waldman, 1984. "The Role of Integrity in Economic Interaction," UCLA Economics Working Papers 350, UCLA Department of Economics.
  44. Michael Waldman, 1983. "Optimal Pricing Given Transaction Costs: The Case of Reserve Versus General Admission Seating," UCLA Economics Working Papers 284, UCLA Department of Economics.
  45. Michael Waldman, 1983. "Limited Collusion and Entry Deterence," UCLA Economics Working Papers 306, UCLA Department of Economics.
  46. Ian Novos & Michael Waldman, 1983. "The Social Welfare Consequences of Limiting Nonexcludability: An Analytical Approach," UCLA Economics Working Papers 295, UCLA Department of Economics.
  47. John Haltiwanger & Michael Waldman, 1983. "Rational Expectations and the Limits of Rationality: An Analysis of Heterogeneity," UCLA Economics Working Papers 303, UCLA Department of Economics.
  48. John Haltiwanger & Michael Waldman, 1983. "Why Bad Wokers Receive Raises," UCLA Economics Working Papers 301, UCLA Department of Economics.
  49. Michael Waldman, 1983. "Job Assignments, Signalling nad Efficiency," UCLA Economics Working Papers 286, UCLA Department of Economics.
  50. John Haltiwanger & Michael Waldman, 1983. "Interpreting Real World Contracts: An Investigation of Ex Post Mutually Beneficial Agreements," UCLA Economics Working Papers 290, UCLA Department of Economics.
  51. Ari Gerstle & Michael Waldman, . "Mergers In Durable-Goods Industries: A Re-Examination Of Market Power And Welfare Effects," American Law & Economics Association Annual Meetings 1038, American Law & Economics Association.

Articles

  1. Waldman, Michael, 2013. "Classic promotion tournaments versus market-based tournaments," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 198-210.
  2. Nodir Adilov & Michael Waldman, 2013. "Optimal Copyright Length And Ex Post Investment: A Mickey Mouse Approach," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 51(2), pages 1101-1122, 04.
  3. Jed DeVaro & Michael Waldman, 2012. "The Signaling Role of Promotions: Further Theory and Empirical Evidence," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 30(1), pages 91 - 147.
  4. Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 2012. "Upgrades, Switching Costs and the Leverage Theory of Tying," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 122(561), pages 675-706, 06.
  5. Michael Waldman, 2010. "Competition, Monopoly, and Aftermarkets," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 26(1), pages 54-91, April.
  6. Justin P. Johnson & Michael Waldman, 2010. "Leasing, Lemons, and Moral Hazard," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(2), pages 307-328, 05.
  7. Hodaka Morita & Michael Waldman, 2010. "Competition, Monopoly Maintenance, and Consumer Switching Costs," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 230-55, February.
  8. Suman Ghosh & Michael Waldman, 2010. "Standard promotion practices versus up-or-out contracts," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(2), pages 301-325.
  9. Dennis W. Carlton & Joshua S. Gans & Michael Waldman, 2010. "Why Tie a Product Consumers Do Not Use?," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(3), pages 85-105, August.
  10. Robert Gibbons & Michael Waldman, 2006. "Enriching a Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics inside Firms," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(1), pages 59-108, January.
  11. Unknown & Michael Waldman & Dennis Carlton, 2005. "How Economics Can Improve Antitrust Doctrine towards Tie-In Sales: Comment on Jean Tirole's "The Analysis of Tying Cases"," CPI Journal, Competition Policy International, vol. 1.
  12. Seonghwan Oh & Michael Waldman, 2005. "The Index of Leading Economic Indicators as a Source of Expectational Shocks," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 31(1), pages 75-95, Winter.
  13. Hodaka Morita & Michael Waldman, 2004. "Durable Goods, Monopoly Maintenance, and Time Inconsistency," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(2), pages 273-302, 06.
  14. Robert Gibbons & Michael Waldman, 2004. "Task-Specific Human Capital," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(2), pages 203-207, May.
  15. Michael Waldman, 2003. "Ex Ante versus Ex Post Optimal Promotion Rules: The Case of Internal Promotion," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 41(1), pages 27-41, January.
  16. Michael Waldman, 2003. "Durable Goods Theory for Real World Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 131-154, Winter.
  17. Johnson, Justin P & Waldman, Michael, 2003. " Leasing, Lemons, and Buybacks," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(2), pages 247-65, Summer.
  18. Dennis W. Carlton & Michael Waldman, 2002. "The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(2), pages 194-220, Summer.
  19. Robert Gibbons & Michael Waldman, 1999. "A Theory Of Wage And Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(4), pages 1321-1358, November.
  20. Waldman, Michael, 1997. "Eliminating the Market for Secondhand Goods: An Alternative Explanation for Leasing," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 40(1), pages 61-92, April.
  21. Ian E. Novos & Michael Waldman, 1997. "Returns to Tenure; Conceptual and Empirical Issues," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 23(3), pages 337-345, Summer.
  22. Michael Waldman, 1996. "Planned Obsolescence and the R&D Decision," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 27(3), pages 583-595, Autumn.
  23. Waldman, Michael, 1996. "Asymmetric learning and the wage/productivity relationship," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 419-429, December.
  24. Waldman, Michael, 1996. "Durable Goods Pricing When Quality Matters," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 69(4), pages 489-510, October.
  25. Waldman, Michael, 1994. "Systematic Errors and the Theory of Natural Selection," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 482-97, June.
  26. Oh, Seonghwan & Waldman, Michael, 1994. "Strategic Complementarity Slows Macroeconomic Adjustment to Temporary Shocks," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 32(2), pages 318-29, April.
  27. Waldman, Michael, 1993. "A New Perspective on Planned Obsolescence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(1), pages 273-83, February.
  28. Haltiwanger, John & Waldman, Michael, 1993. "The role of altruism in economic interaction," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 1-15, May.
  29. Michael Waldman, 1991. "The Role of Multiple Potential Entrants/Sequential Entry in Noncooperative Entry Deterrence," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(3), pages 446-453, Autumn.
  30. Bruce, Neil & Waldman, Michael, 1991. "Transfers in Kind: Why They Can Be Efficient and Nonpaternalistic," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1345-51, December.
  31. Haltiwanger, John & Waldman, Michael, 1991. "Responders versus Non-responders: A New Perspective on Heterogeneity," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 101(408), pages 1085-1102, September.
  32. Bruce, Neil & Waldman, Michael, 1990. "The Rotten-Kid Theorem Meets the Samaritan's Dilemma," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(1), pages 155-65, February.
  33. Waldman, Michael, 1990. "Up-or-Out Contracts: A Signaling Perspective," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 8(2), pages 230-50, April.
  34. Oh, Seonghwan & Waldman, Michael, 1990. "The Macroeconomic Effects of False Announcements," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(4), pages 1017-34, November.
  35. Haltiwanger, John C & Waldman, Michael, 1989. "Limited Rationality and Strategic Complements: The Implications for Macroeconomics," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(3), pages 463-83, August.
  36. Waldman, Michael, 1989. "Information on worker ability : An analysis of investment within the firm," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 57-80.
  37. Haltiwanger, John C & Waldman, Michael, 1989. "Rational Expectations in the Aggregate," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 27(4), pages 619-36, October.
  38. Waldman, Michael, 1987. "Noncooperative Entry Deterrence, Uncertainty, and the Free Rider Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(2), pages 301-10, April.
  39. Haltiwanger, John & Waldman, Michael, 1986. "Insurance and Labor Market Contracting: An Analysis of the Capital Market Assumption," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 4(3), pages 355-75, July.
  40. Haltiwanger, John & Waldman, Michael, 1985. "Rational Expectations and the Limits of Rationality: An Analysis of Heterogeneity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(3), pages 326-40, June.
  41. Waldman, Michael, 1984. "Worker Allocation, Hierarchies and the Wage Distribution," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(1), pages 95-109, January.
  42. Novos, Ian E & Waldman, Michael, 1984. "The Effects of Increased Copyright Protection: An Analytic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(2), pages 236-46, April.
  43. Michael Waldman, 1984. "Job Assignments, Signalling, and Efficiency," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 255-267, Summer.

Chapters

  1. Michael Waldman, 2012. "Theory and Evidence in Internal LaborMarkets
    [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]
    ," Introductory Chapters, Princeton University Press.
  2. Gibbons, Robert & Waldman, Michael, 1999. "Careers in organizations: Theory and evidence," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 36, pages 2373-2437 Elsevier.

NEP Fields

23 papers by this author were announced in NEP, and specifically in the following field reports (number of papers):
  1. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (3) 2007-01-14 2007-01-28 2013-02-16
  2. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (6) 2004-11-07 2005-06-14 2007-01-14 2007-02-10 2007-08-27 2008-07-30. Author is listed
  3. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory & Applications (1) 2013-02-16
  4. NEP-DEM: Demographic Economics (1) 2012-02-20
  5. NEP-EVO: Evolutionary Economics (1) 2001-06-08
  6. NEP-HEA: Health Economics (1) 2012-02-20
  7. NEP-HRM: Human Capital & Human Resource Management (1) 2013-02-16
  8. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (2) 2004-11-22 2007-01-14
  9. NEP-IPR: Intellectual Property Rights (1) 2013-03-16
  10. NEP-LAB: Labour Economics (3) 2007-01-14 2007-10-06 2013-02-16
  11. NEP-LMA: Labor Markets - Supply, Demand, & Wages (1) 2013-02-16
  12. NEP-LTV: Unemployment, Inequality & Poverty (1) 2003-07-21
  13. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (2) 2005-06-14 2007-08-27
  14. NEP-MKT: Marketing (1) 2008-07-30
  15. NEP-PPM: Project, Program & Portfolio Management (1) 2007-02-10

Statistics

This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:
  1. Average Rank Score
  2. Number of Works
  3. Number of Distinct Works
  4. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
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  6. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors
  7. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  8. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  9. Number of Citations
  10. Number of Citations, Discounted by Citation Age
  11. Number of Citations, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
  12. Number of Citations, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor, Discounted by Citation Age
  13. Number of Citations, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  14. Number of Citations, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor, Discounted by Citation Age
  15. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors
  16. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors, Discounted by Citation Age
  17. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  18. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors, Discounted by Citation Age
  19. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  20. Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors, Discounted by Citation Age
  21. h-index
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  23. Number of Registered Citing Authors, Weighted by Rank (Max. 1 per Author)
  24. Number of Journal Pages
  25. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
  26. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
  27. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors
  28. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
  29. Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
  30. Number of Abstract Views in RePEc Services over the past 12 months, Weighted by Number of Authors
  31. Number of Downloads through RePEc Services over the past 12 months, Weighted by Number of Authors
  32. Breadth of citations across fields
  33. Wu-Index
  34. Strength of students

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