This article considers a durable goods monopolist's choice of price and durability in a setting where durability choice controls the speed with which quality deteriorates. This article derives three main results: the price at which old units trade on the secondhand market limits what the firm can charge for new units; because of this linkage between the prices for new and old units, the firm chooses a durability level that is below the socially optimal level; and the incentive to reduce durability can be sufficiently severe that the monopolist eliminates the market for secondhand goods. Copyright 1996 by University of Chicago Press.
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Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Business.
Volume (Year): 69 (1996) Issue (Month): 4 (October) Pages: 489-510 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
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