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What Limits Indirect Appropriability?

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  • Waldman, Michael

Abstract

One argument concerning copyright protection is that the returns to copyright protection are limited because of indirect appropriability, where indirect appropriability is the idea that original producers receive returns from copying because the buyers of original units are willing to pay more when they can sell copies. This paper argues that indirect appropriability is limited in most real world markets and explores in a series of theoretical models why this is the case.

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File URL: http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/44690/
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 44690.

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Date of creation: 20 Feb 2013
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:44690

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Keywords: copyright; indirect appropriability;

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References

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  1. Waldman, Michael, 1996. "Durable Goods Pricing When Quality Matters," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 69(4), pages 489-510, October.
  2. Benjamin, Daniel K & Kormendi, Roger C, 1974. "The Interrelationship between Markets for New and Used Durable Goods," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 17(2), pages 381-401, October.
  3. Swan, Peter L, 1980. "Alcoa: The Influence of Recycling on Monopoly Power," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(1), pages 76-99, February.
  4. ANDERSON, Simon P. & GINSBURGH, Victor A., . "Price discrimination via second-hand markets," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1078, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  5. Liebowitz, S J, 1985. "Copying and Indirect Appropriability: Photocopying of Journals," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(5), pages 945-57, October.
  6. Miller, H Laurence, Jr, 1974. "On Killing off the Market for Used Textbooks and the Relationship between Markets for New and Secondhand Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 82(3), pages 612-19, May/June.
  7. Novos, Ian E & Waldman, Michael, 1984. "The Effects of Increased Copyright Protection: An Analytic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(2), pages 236-46, April.
  8. Michael Waldman, 2003. "Durable Goods Theory for Real World Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(1), pages 131-154, Winter.
  9. Bagnoli, Mark & Salant, Stephen W & Swierzbinski, Joseph E, 1989. "Durable-Goods Monopoly with Discrete Demand," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(6), pages 1459-78, December.
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