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Up-or-Out Contracts: A Signaling Perspective

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Author Info
Waldman, Michael

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Abstract

A firm will typically gather information concerning its own workers that is not available to other potential employers, while other firms will attempt to reduce this information asymmetry by observing the actions of the initial employer. The author argues that this process can be important in environments characterized by up-or-out contracts in that the retentions decision can serve as a signal of productivity. The article investigates this argument in an environment where in-or-out contracts are employed because they provide workers with an incentive to accumulate general human capital and where learning takes place in a diffuse fashion. Copyright 1990 by University of Chicago Press.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Labor Economics.

Volume (Year): 8 (1990)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 230-50
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:8:y:1990:i:2:p:230-50

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Harris, Milton & Holstrom, Bengt, 1982. "A Theory of Wage Dynamics," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 49(3), pages 315-33, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Milgrom, Paul & Oster, Sharon, 1987. "Job Discrimination, Market Forces, and the Invisibility Hypothesis," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(3), pages 453-76, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Novos, I.E., 1988. "Worker Preferences And Firm Structure," Papers m8821, Southern California - Department of Economics.
  4. Michael Waldman, 1984. "Job Assignments, Signalling, and Efficiency," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 255-267, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Kahn, Charles & Huberman, Gur, 1988. "Two-sided Uncertainty and "Up-or-Out" Contracts," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 6(4), pages 423-44, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Edward P. Lazear, 1984. "Raids and Offermatching," NBER Working Papers 1419, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Prescott, Edward C & Visscher, Michael, 1980. "Organization Capital," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(3), pages 446-61, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. MacDonald, Glenn M, 1982. "A Market Equilibrium Theory of Job Assignment and Sequential Accumulation of Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 1038-55, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Ricart i Costa, Joan E, 1988. "Managerial Task Assignment and Promotions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 449-66, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Khovanskaya, Irina & Sonin, Konstantin & Yudkevich, Maria, 2008. "Budget Uncertainty and Faculty Contracts: A Dynamic Framework for Comparative Analysis," CEPR Discussion Papers 6744, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Jan Zabojnik, 2008. "Promotion Tournaments in Market Equilibrium," Working Papers 1193, Queen's University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Cater, Bruce & Lew, Byron & Pivato, Marcus, 2009. "Why tenure?," MPRA Paper 14823, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  4. Sliwka, Dirk, 2004. "On the Notion of Responsibility in Organizations," IZA Discussion Papers 1423, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Heisz, Andrew & Oreopoulos, Philip, 2006. "Importance des signaux de compétence pour l'obtention d'un emploi et de l'avancement," Direction des études analytiques : documents de recherche 2006236f, Statistics Canada, Direction des études analytiques. [Downloadable!]
  6. Carolyn Pitchik & Aloysius Siow, 1997. "Self-Promoting Investments," Working Papers pitchik-97-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Robert Gibbons & Michael Waldman, 2003. "Enriching a Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms," NBER Working Papers 9849, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. James Malcomson & James W. Maw & Barry McCormick, 2002. "General Training by Firms, Apprentice Contracts, and Public Policy," Economics Series Working Papers 086, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. James B. Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor, 2006. "When Knowledge Is an Asset: Explaining the Organizational Structure of Large Law Firms," IZA Discussion Papers 2353, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Alexander K. Koch & Eloïc Peyrache, 2008. "Aligning Ambition and Incentives," Economics Working Papers 2008-16, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Heisz, Andrew & Oreopoulos, Philip, 2006. "The Importance of Signalling in Job Placement and Promotion," Analytical Studies Branch Research Paper Series 2006236e, Statistics Canada, Analytical Studies Branch. [Downloadable!]
  12. Dan Bernhardt & Steeve Mongrain, 2007. "The Layoff Rat Race," Discussion Papers dp07-06, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University. [Downloadable!]
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