References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

1. Gibbons, R. & Katz, L.F., 1989. "Layoffs And Lemons," Working papers 531, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
   Other versions:
   • Robert Gibbons & Lawrence Katz, 1989. "Layoffs and Lemons," Working Papers 629, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.. [Downloadable!]
   • Robert Gibbons & Lawrence Katz, 1991. "Layoffs and Lemons," NBER Working Papers 2968, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Gibbons, Robert & Katz, Lawrence F, 1991. "Layoffs and Lemons," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 9(4), pages 351-80, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Malcomson, James M, 1984. "Work Incentives, Hierarchy, and Internal Labor Markets," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(3), pages 486-507, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Zhiqi Chen & J. Stephen Ferris, 1995. "A Theory of Tenure for the Teaching University," Carleton Economic Papers 95-12, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
   Other versions:
   • Chen, Zhiqi & Ferris, J Stephen, 1999. "A Theory of Tenure for the Teaching University," Australian Economic Papers, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(1), pages 9-25, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Acemoglu, Daron & Pischke, Jörn-Steffen, 1996. "Why do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence," CEPR Discussion Papers 1460, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Acemoglu, D. & Pischki, J.S., 1996. "Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence," Working papers 96-7, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
   • Daron Acemoglu & Jorn-Steffen Pischke, 1996. "Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 5605, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Daron Acemoglu & Jörn-Steffen Pischke, 1998. "Why Do Firms Train? Theory And Evidence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(1), pages 78-118, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Hallock, Kevin F, 1995. "Seniority and Monopsony in the Academic Labor Market: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(3), pages 654-57, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Kevin Hallock, 1994. "Seniority and Monopsony in the Academic Labor Market: Comment," Working Papers 715, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.. [Downloadable!]
6. Chang, Chun & Wang, Yijiang, 1996. "Human Capital Investment under Asymmetric Information: The Pigovian Conjecture Revisited," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 14(3), pages 505-19, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Ransom, Michael R, 1993. "Seniority and Monopsony in the Academic Labor Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 221-33, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Blass, Asher A, 1992. "Does the Baseball Labor Market Contradict the Human Capital Model of Investment?," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 74(2), pages 261-68, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Michael Waldman, 1984. "Job Assignments, Signalling, and Efficiency," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(2), pages 255-267, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Michael Waldman, 1983. "Job Assignments, Signalling nad Efficiency," UCLA Economics Working Papers 286, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
10. Bernt Bratsberg & James F. Ragan & Jr & John T. Warren, 2003. "Negative returns to seniority: New evidence in academic markets," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, ILR School, Cornell University, vol. 56(2), pages 306-323, January.
11. Greenwald, Bruce C, 1986. "Adverse Selection in the Labour Market," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 53(3), pages 325-47, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Bernhardt, Dan & Scoones, David, 1993. "Promotion, Turnover, and Preemptive Wage Offers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 771-91, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • David Scoones & Dan Bernhardt, 1991. "Promotion, Turnover and Preemptive Wage Offers," Working Papers 817, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
13. MacLeod, W Bentley & Malcomson, James M, 1988. "Reputation and Hierarchy in Dynamic Models of Employment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(4), pages 832-54, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Bentley MacLeod & James M. Malcomson, 1985. "Reputation and Hierarchy in Dynamic Models of Employment," Working Papers 628, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
14. Paul R. Milgrom, 1984. "Job Discrimination, Market Forces and the Invisibility Hypothesis," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 708R, Cowles Foundation, Yale University, revised 1985. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Milgrom, Paul & Oster, Sharon, 1987. "Job Discrimination, Market Forces, and the Invisibility Hypothesis," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(3), pages 453-76, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
15. Gale, Douglas & Hellwig, Martin, 1985. "Incentive-Compatible Debt Contracts: The One-Period Problem," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 52(4), pages 647-63, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
16. Kahn, Charles & Huberman, Gur, 1988. "Two-sided Uncertainty and "Up-or-Out" Contracts," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 6(4), pages 423-44, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
17. Edward P. Lazear, 1984. "Raids and Offermatching," NBER Working Papers 1419, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
18. Moore, William J & Newman, Robert J & Turnbull, Geoffrey K, 1998. "Do Academic Salaries Decline with Seniority?," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(2), pages 352-66, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
19. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
20. Aaron Edlin & Stefan Reichelstein, 1995. "Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series 1155, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Aaron S. Edlin & Stefan Reichelstein, 1997. "Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment," NBER Working Papers 5007, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • Edlin, Aaron S & Reichelstein, Stefan, 1996. "Holdups, Standard Breach Remedies, and Optimal Investment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 478-501, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
21. Carmichael, H Lorne, 1988. "Incentives in Academics: Why Is There Tenure?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(3), pages 453-72, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
22. Waldman, Michael, 1990. "Up-or-Out Contracts: A Signaling Perspective," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 8(2), pages 230-50, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Michael Waldman, 1989. "Up-or-Out Contracts: A Signaling Perspective," UCLA Economics Working Papers 556, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
23. Altonji, Joseph G & Shakotko, Robert A, 1987. "Do Wages Rise with Job Seniority?," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 54(3), pages 437-59, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Joseph G. Altonji & Robert A. Shakotko, 1985. "Do Wages Rise With Job Seniority?," NBER Working Papers 1616, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • Joseph Altonji & R. Shakotko, 1985. "Do Wages Rise with Job Seniority?," Working Papers 567, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Industrial Relations Section.. [Downloadable!]
24. Ricart i Costa, Joan E, 1988. "Managerial Task Assignment and Promotions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 449-66, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
25. Topel, Robert H, 1991. "Specific Capital, Mobility, and Wages: Wages Rise with Job Seniority," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(1), pages 145-76, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Robert H. Topel, 1990. "Specific Capital, Mobility, and Wages: Wages Rise with Job Seniority," NBER Working Papers 3294, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
26. Lorne Carmichael, 1981. "Firm-Specific Human Capital and Promotion Ladders," Working Papers 452, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
    • Lorne Carmichael, 1983. "Firm-Specific Human Capital and Promotion Ladders," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(1), pages 251-258, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
27. Lazear, Edward P, 1986. "Salaries and Piece Rates," Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(3), pages 405-31, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
28. Milgrom, Paul R, 1988. "Employment Contracts, Influence Activities, and Efficient Organization Design," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 96(1), pages 42-60, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Paul R. Milgrom., 1987. "Employment Contracts, Influence Activities and Efficient Organization Design," Economics Working Papers 8741, University of California at Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
29. Bernhardt, Dan, 1995. "Strategic Promotion and Compensation," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 62(2), pages 315-39, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
30. Smith Freeman, 1977. "Wage Trends as Performance Displays Productive Potential: A Model and Application to Academic Early Retirement," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(2), pages 419-443, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
31. Siow, Aloysius, 1998. "Tenure and Other Unusual Personnel Practices in Academia," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(1), pages 152-73, April.