The labor market effects of employer recruitment choice
AbstractI analyze employer recruitment decisions using a dynamic, discrete-choice structural model that I estimate on a sample of clerical workers from the MCSUI, a large cross section of establishments in four metropolitan areas of the US. In the model, employers choose either informal recruitment methods (which generate a small but select applicant pool from which the employer can hire quickly) or formal methods (which create a large but less select applicant pool which the employer must screen intensively, delaying hiring times). I study the effects of three counterfactual simulations on recruitment strategies, starting wages, and vacancy durations: A wage subsidy, a policy designed to improve information about prospective matches, and an increase in the heterogeneity of prospective matches. I show that the effects of exogenous policy or environmental changes can be decomposed into "pure wage effects" that affect the wage offers employers post, holding constant their recruitment strategies, and "recruitment-wage effects" that involve changes in recruitment methods. The results show that changes in recruitment strategies represent an important channel through which changes in the economic environment affect the starting wages and vacancy duration for new hires.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 52 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer
Other versions of this item:
- Jed DeVaro, 2005. "The Labor Market Effects of Employer Recruitment Choice," Labor and Demography 0508006, EconWPA.
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