Pay-performance sensitivity and production uncertainty
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 53 (1996)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
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