Tractability in Incentive Contracting
Abstract
of the noise distribution, utility function and reservation utility.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Paper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2010 Meeting Papers with number 1120.Length:
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:red:sed010:1120
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Postal: Society for Economic Dynamics Christian Zimmermann Economic Research Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis PO Box 442 St. Louis MO 63166-0442 USA
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Web page: http://www.EconomicDynamics.org/society.htm
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Related research
Keywords:Other versions of this item:
- Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2011. "Tractability in Incentive Contracting," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 24(9), pages 2865-2894.
- Edmans, Alex & Gabaix, Xavier, 2009. "Tractability in Incentive Contracting," CEPR Discussion Papers 7578, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2009. "Tractability in Incentive Contracting," NBER Working Papers 15545, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
- G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
- J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2010.
"Risk and the CEO Market: Why Do Some Large Firms Hire Highly-Paid, Low-Talent CEOs?,"
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15987, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Edmans, Alex & Gabaix, Xavier, 2010. "Risk and the CEO Market: Why Do Some Large Firms Hire Highly-Paid, Low-Talent CEOs?," CEPR Discussion Papers 7836, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- LiCalzi, Marco & Pavan, Alessandro, 2005.
"Tilting the supply schedule to enhance competition in uniform-price auctions,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 227-250, January.
- Marco LiCalz & Alessandro Pavan, 2002. "Tilting the Supply Schedule to Enhance Competition on Uniform-Price Auctions," Discussion Papers 1495, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Marco LiCalzi & Alessandro Pavan, 2003. "Tilting the Supply Schedule to Enhance Competition in Uniform-Price Auctions," Working Papers 2003.22, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Marco LiCalzi & Alessandro Pavan, 2002. "Tilting the Supply Schedule to Enhance Competition in Uniform- Price Auctions," Game Theory and Information 0210003, EconWPA.
- George-Marios Angeletos & Alessandro Pavan, 2006.
"Socially Optimal Coordination: Characterization and Policy Implications,"
Discussion Papers
1496, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- George-Marios Angeletos & Alessandro Pavan, 2007. "Socially Optimal Coordination: Characterization and Policy Implications," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 5(2-3), pages 585-593, 04-05.
- George-Marios Angeletos & Alessandro Pavan, 2006. "Socially Optimal Coordination: Characterization and Policy Implications," NBER Working Papers 12778, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Daniel Garrett & Alessandro Pavan, 2010.
"Managerial Turnover in a Changing World,"
Discussion Papers
1490, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Daniel F. Garrett & Alessandro Pavan, 2012. "Managerial Turnover in a Changing World," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 120(5), pages 879 - 925.
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