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Physician Incentives in Health Maintenance Organizations

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Author Info
Martin Gaynor, James B. Rebitzer, and Lowell J. Taylor

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Abstract

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Publisher Info
Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 112 (2004)
Issue (Month): 4 (August)
Pages: 915-931
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jpolec:v:112:y:2004:i:4:p:915-931

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  1. Gorkem Celik, 2008. "Counter Marginalization of Information Rents: Implementing Negatively Correlated Compensation Schemes for Colluding Parties," Contributions to Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 8(1), pages 1363-1363. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Jennifer Arlen & W.Bentley Macleod, 2004. "Torts, Expertise, and Authority: Liability of Physicians and Managed Care Organizations," Working Papers 04-26, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. David Cooper & James Rebitzer, 2006. "Managed Care and Physician Incentives: The Effects of Competition on the Cost and Quality of Care," Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 5(1), pages 1409-1409. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Martin Chalkley & Colin Tilley, 2006. "Treatment intensity and provider remuneration: dentists in the British National Health Service," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 15(9), pages 933-946. [Downloadable!]
  5. Das, Jishnu & Hammer, Jeffrey, 2005. "Money for nothing : the dire straits of medical practice in Delhi, India," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3669, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
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This page was last updated on 2008-8-11.


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