According to Edward P. Lazear, workers and firms enter into long-term implicit contracts that discou rage shirking and malfeasance by shifting compensation to the end of the contract. Such "delayed payment" contracts are less likely to o ccur in jobs in which it is comparatively simple to monitor worker ef fort. This paper uses data from the National Longitudinal Survey and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles to test that hypothesis. In par ticular, it tests whether jobs that involve repetitive tasks tend to be characterized by an absence of pensions, mandatory retirement, lon g job tenures, and high wages for older workers. Copyright 1987 by University of Chicago Press.
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Volume (Year): 5 (1987) Issue (Month): 4 (October) Pages: S153-70 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML,
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:5:y:1987:i:4:p:s153-70
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