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Marriage Formation with Assortative Meeting as a Two-Sided Optimal Stopping Problem

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  • Alessandro Tampieri

    ()
    (CREA, University of Luxembourg)

Abstract

In this paper we study marriage formation through a two-sided secretary problem approach. We consider individuals with non transferable utility and two different dimensions of heterogeneity, a characteristic evaluated according to the idiosyncratic preferences of potential partners, and a universally-rankable characteristic. There are two possible states of the world, one in which people meet their partner randomly, and one in which the meeting occurs between individuals with similar characteristics. We show that individuals with higher universal characteristic tend to be more picky in their marriage hunting. This does not necessarily mean that they marry later than other individuals, since the higher expected quality of their potential partners in the assortative meeting state can make them marry earlier than individuals with a lower universal characterictic.

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File URL: http://wwwfr.uni.lu/content/download/66883/845826/file/2013-29%20-%20Marriage%20Formation%20with%20Assortative%20Meeting%20as%20a%20Two-Sided%20Optimal%20Stopping%20Problem.pdf
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Paper provided by Center for Research in Economic Analysis, University of Luxembourg in its series CREA Discussion Paper Series with number 13-29.

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Date of creation: 2013
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Handle: RePEc:luc:wpaper:13-29

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Keywords: secretary problem; random meeting; assortative meeting;

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  1. Diamond, Peter A, 1982. "Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(5), pages 881-94, October.
  2. Ettore Damiano & Hao Li, 2004. "Unraveling of Dynamic Sorting," 2004 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics 174, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  3. Alp E. Atakan, 2006. "Assortative Matching with Explicit Search Costs," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 74(3), pages 667-680, 05.
  4. Mortensen, Dale T, 1982. "Property Rights and Efficiency in Mating, Racing, and Related Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 968-79, December.
  5. Bloch, Francis & Ryder, Harl, 2000. "Two-Sided Search, Marriages, and Matchmakers," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(1), pages 93-115, February.
  6. Caldarelli, G. & Capocci, A., 2001. "Beauty and distance in the stable marriage problem," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 300(1), pages 325-331.
  7. Chade, Hector, 2001. "Two-sided search and perfect segregation with fixed search costs," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 31-51, July.
  8. Ettore Damiano & Hao Li & Wing Suen, 2005. "Unravelling of Dynamic Sorting," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 72(4), pages 1057-1076.
  9. Burdett, Ken & Coles, Melvyn G, 1997. "Marriage and Class," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 112(1), pages 141-68, February.
  10. Sattinger, Michael, 1995. "Search and the Efficient Assignment of Workers to Jobs," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 36(2), pages 283-302, May.
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