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Two-Sided Search, Marriages, and Matchmakers

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Author Info
Bloch, Francis
Ryder, Harl

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Abstract

This article analyzes the provision of matching services in a model of two-sided search. Agents belong to two heterogeneous populations and are distributed on [0, 1]. Their utility is equal to the index of their mate. In a search equilibrium agents form subintervals and are only matched to agents inside their class. Marriage brokers match agents according to a centralized procedure. If the matchmaker charges a uniform participation fee, only agents of higher quality participate in the centralized procedure. If the matchmaker charges a commission on the matching surplus, only agents of lower quality go to the intermediary. Copyright 2000 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 41 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 93-115
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Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:41:y:2000:i:1:p:93-115

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  1. Melvyn G. Coles & Marco Francesconi, 2007. "On the Emergence of Toyboys: Equilibrium Matching with Ageing and Uncertain Careers," IZA Discussion Papers 2612, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  2. Frederick Chen, 2003. "Unraveling in a dynamic matching market with Nash bargaining," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 3(17), pages 1-6. [Downloadable!]
  3. Gautier, Pieter A & Svarer, Michael & Teulings, Coen N, 2005. "Marriage and the City," CEPR Discussion Papers 4939, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Nadia Burani, 2008. "Matching, search and intermediation with two-sided heterogeneity," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 75-117, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Damiano, Ettore & Li, Hao, 2005. "Price Discrimination and Efficient Matching," Micro Theory Working Papers damiano-05-03-21-12-21-58, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 22 Mar 2005. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Paolini, Dimitri, 2000. "Two-Sided Search and Temporary Employment," Discussion Papers (IRES - Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales) 2000011, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES). [Downloadable!]
  7. Amitrajeet Batabyal, 2004. "On strategy and the likelihood of success in marital matchmaking under uncertainty," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 10(7), pages 1-7. [Downloadable!]
  8. Dan Anderberg, 2004. "Getting Hitched: The Equilibrium Marriage Market Behaviour of a British Cohort," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 04/12, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Jul 2004. [Downloadable!]
  9. Padma Rao Sahib & Xinhua Gu, 2002. "To Tie the Knot or Not," Demographic Research, Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research, Rostock, Germany, vol. 6(13), pages 355-382, May. [Downloadable!]
  10. Cowan,Robin & Jonard,Nicolas, 2004. "Information Technology and the Dynamics of Joint Innovation," Research Memoranda 014, Maastricht : MERIT, Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology. [Downloadable!]
  11. Hector Chade & Gustavo Ventura, . "Income Taxation and Marital Decisions," Working Papers 2133479, Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Hector Chade & Gustavo Ventura, . "Taxes and Marriage: A Two-Sided Search Analysis," Working Papers 2132862, Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  13. Eriksson, Kimmo & Karlander, Johan & Öller, Lars-Erik, 1997. "Hierarchical Assignments: Stability and Fairness," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 201, Stockholm School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Ramya Sundaram, 2000. "Multiple Traits in the Marriage Market: Does Diversity Sometimes Win?," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1666, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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