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On the Emergence of Toyboys: Equilibrium Matching with Ageing and Uncertain Careers

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Author Info
Melvyn G. Coles () (University of Essex)
Marco Francesconi () (University of Essex and IZA)

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Abstract

Toyboy marriages (where the female partner is at least 5 years older than her male partner) have grown threefold since the 1970s in the United States and Britain. This paper examines this phenomenon using an equilibrium search framework in which becoming successful in the labour market takes time and fitness decays with age. Our framework hinges on contract incompleteness in the marriage market and the assumption that the marginal gain to marrying someone rich is greatest for someone poor. With this structure we can explain why successful (older) types might marry fitter (younger) and less successful types. We show that toyboy marriages arise in equilibrium only when men and women have comparable labour market opportunities. U.S. and British data confirm this indicating that the probability that a woman is married to a toyboy increases by about 45 percent if, relative to her partner’s, she is more educated and in a better paid job.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 2612.

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Length: 45 pages
Date of creation: Feb 2007
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Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2612

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Related research
Keywords: two-sided search; marriage; ex-ante heterogeneity; non-transferable utility; ageing;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
J62 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Job, Occupational and Intergenerational Mobility; Promotion

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References listed on IDEAS
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    Other versions:
  3. Alison Booth & Melvyn Coles, 2005. "Education, Matching and the Allocative Value of Romance," IZA Discussion Papers 1649, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1993. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(6), pages 988-1010, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. S. Rao Aiyagari & Jeremy Greenwood & Nezih Guner, 2000. "On the State of the Union," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 108(2), pages 213-244, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Lones Smith, 2006. "The Marriage Model with Search Frictions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 114(6), pages 1124-1146, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Eeckhout, Jan, 1999. "Bilateral Search and Vertical Heterogeneity," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 40(4), pages 869-87, November.
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    Other versions:
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    Other versions:
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    Other versions:
  17. John Ermisch & Marco Francesconi, 2000. "Cohabitation in Great Britain: not for long, but here to stay," Journal Of The Royal Statistical Society Series A, Royal Statistical Society, vol. 163(2), pages 153-171. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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    Other versions:
  20. Coen N. Teulings & Pieter A. Gautier, 2004. "The Right Man for the Job," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 71(2), pages 553-580, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  21. Robert Shimer & Lones Smith, 2000. "Assortative Matching and Search," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(2), pages 343-370, March.
    Other versions:
  22. Eugenio Giolito, 2004. "A Search Model of Marriage with Differential Fecundity," Labor and Demography 0402007, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
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  27. repec:bep:macfro:v:1:y:2004:i:1:p:1102-1102 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Other versions:
  29. Tracy J. Cornelius, 2003. "A Search Model of Marriage and Divorce," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 6(1), pages 135-155, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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