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Marriage with Labor Supply

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  • Nicolas Jacquemet
  • Jean-Marc Robin

    (Département d'économie)

Abstract

We propose a search-matching model of the marriage market that extends Shimer and Smith (2000) to allow for labor supply. We characterize the steady-state equilibrium when exogenous divorce is the only source of risk. The estimated matching probabilities that can be derived from the steady-state flow conditions are strongly increasing in both male and female wages. We estimate that the share of marriage surplus appropriated by the man increases with his wage and that the share appropriated by the woman decreases with her wage. We find that leisure is an inferior good for men and a normal good for women.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Sciences Po in its series Sciences Po publications with number info:hdl:2441/eu4vqp9ompqllr09j00420pk7.

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Date of creation: Sep 2011
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Handle: RePEc:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/eu4vqp9ompqllr09j00420pk7

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Related research

Keywords: Marriage search model; Collective labor supply; Structural estimation;

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References

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  1. Chiappori, Pierre-André & Fortin, Bernard & Lacroix, Guy, 2001. "Marriage Market, Divorce Legislation and Household Labor Supply," Cahiers de recherche 0103, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
  2. Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Murat Iyigun & Yoram Weiss, 2008. "An Assignment Model with Divorce and Remarriage," Working Papers 2009-002, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics.
  3. Wong, Linda, 2001. "Structural Estimation of Marriage Models," 10th International Conference on Panel Data, Berlin, July 5-6, 2002 A1-1, International Conferences on Panel Data.
  4. Elizabeth M. Caucutt & Nezih Guner & John Knowles, 2002. "Why Do Women Wait? Matching, Wage Inequality, and the Incentives for Fertility Delay," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 5(4), pages 815-855, October.
  5. Richard Blundell & Pierre-André Chiappori & Thierry Magnac & Costas Meghir, 2001. "Collective Labor Supply : Heterogeneity and Nonparticipation," Working Papers 2001-32, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
  6. Shannon Seitz, 2009. "Accounting for Racial Differences in Marriage and Employment," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(3), pages 385-437, 07.
  7. Daniela Del Boca & Christopher J. Flinn, 2005. "Household Time Allocation and Modes of Behavior: A Theory of Sorts," CHILD Working Papers wp15_05, CHILD - Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic economics - ITALY.
  8. Eugene Choo & Shannon Seitz & Aloysuis Siow, 2008. "The Collective Marriage Matching Model: Identification, Estimation and Testing," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 704, Boston College Department of Economics.
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  23. Shelly J. Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak & Terence J. Wales, 1997. "Do Husbands and Wives Pool Their Resources? Evidence from the United Kingdom Child Benefit," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 32(3), pages 463-480.
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  27. Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes & Shoshana Grossbard, 2007. "Cohort-level sex ratio effects on women’s labor force participation," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 249-278, September.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Arnaud Dupuy & Alfred Galichon, 2012. "Personality Traits and the Marriage Market," Working Papers 2012/41, Maastricht School of Management.
  2. Jeremy Greenwood & Nezih Guner & Georgi Kocharkov & Cezar Santos, 2011. "Technology and the Changing Family: A Unified Model of Marriage, Divorce, Educational Attainment and Married Female Labor-Force Participation," Economie d'Avant Garde Research Reports 18, Economie d'Avant Garde.
  3. Clement Joubert & Sekyu Choi, 2012. "The value of remarriage," 2012 Meeting Papers 1111, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  4. Zvi Eckstein, 2012. "Household Interaction and the Labor Supply of Married Women," 2012 Meeting Papers 18, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  5. Flabbi, Luca & Mabli, James, 2012. "Household Search or Individual Search: Does It Matter? Evidence from Lifetime Inequality Estimates," IZA Discussion Papers 6908, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  6. Bernard Salanié & Alfred Galichon, 2013. "Cupid's Invisible Hand: Social Surplus and Identification in Matching Models," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/5rkqqmvrn4t, Sciences Po.
  7. John A. Knowles, 2013. "Why are Married Men Working So Much? An Aggregate Analysis of Intra-Household Bargaining and Labour Supply," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 80(3), pages 1055-1085.
  8. Christian Bayer & Klaus Waelde, 2011. "Describing the Dynamics of Distributions in Search and Matching Models by Fokker-Planck Equations," Working Papers 1110, Gutenberg School of Management and Economics, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz, revised 21 Jul 2011.

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