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Household Time Allocation and Models of Behavior: A Theory of Sorts

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  • Daniela Del Boca
  • Christopher J. Flinn

Abstract

We make the point that a flexible specification of spousal preferences and household production technology precludes the possibility of using revealed preference data on household time allocations to determine the manner in which spouses interact. Under strong, but standard, assumptions regarding marriage market equilibria, marital sorting patterns can be used essentially as "out of sample" information that allows us to assess whether household behavior is cooperative. We use a sample of households drawn from a recent wave of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, and find some evidence supporting the view that households behave in a cooperative manner.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Collegio Carlo Alberto in its series Carlo Alberto Notebooks with number 8.

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Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision: 2006
Handle: RePEc:cca:wpaper:8

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Keywords: Bilateral Matching; Household Time Allocation; Nash Bargaining;

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References

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  1. Aiyagari, S.R. & Greenwood, J. & Guner, N., 1999. "On the State of the Union," RCER Working Papers 462, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
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  8. Michael J. Brien & Lee A. Lillard & Steven Stern, 2006. "Cohabitation, Marriage, And Divorce In A Model Of Match Quality," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 47(2), pages 451-494, 05.
  9. Daniela Del Boca & Christopher J. Flinn, 2004. "Modes of Spousal Interaction and the Labor Market Environment," CHILD Working Papers wp12_05, CHILD - Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic economics - ITALY.
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  23. Flinn, C.J., 1998. "Modes of Interaction Between Divorced Parents," Working Papers 98-04, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
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