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The Collective Marriage Matching Model: Identification, Estimation and Testing

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  • Eugene Choo
  • Shannon Seitz
  • Aloysius Siow

Abstract

We develop and estimate an empirical collective model with endogenous marriage formation, participation, and family labor supply. Intra-household transfers arise endogenously as the transfers that clear the marriage market. The intra-household allocation can be recovered from observations on marriage decisions. Introducing the marriage market in the collective model allows us to independently estimate transfers from labor supplies and from marriage decisions. We estimate a semi-parametric version of our model using 2000 US Census data. Estimates of the model using marriage data are much more consistent with the theoretical predictions than estimates derived from labor supply.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Toronto, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number tecipa-340.

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Length: 67 pages
Date of creation: 09 Oct 2008
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:tor:tecipa:tecipa-340

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Keywords: collective model; marriage matching; intrahousehold allocations;

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References

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  1. Michael J. Brien & Lee A. Lillard & Steven Stern, 2006. "Cohabitation, Marriage, And Divorce In A Model Of Match Quality," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 47(2), pages 451-494, 05.
  2. Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, 1996. "Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 139-158, Fall.
  3. Daniela Del Boca & Christopher Flinn, 2009. "Endogeneous Household Interaction," CHILD Working Papers wp08_09, CHILD - Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic economics - ITALY.
  4. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "A Theory of Marriage: Part II," NBER Chapters, in: Marriage, Family, Human Capital, and Fertility, pages 11-26 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Richard Blundell & Martin Browning & Ian Crawford, 1998. "Nonparametric Engel Curves and Revealed Preference," Discussion Papers 99-07, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  6. Jeremy Lise & Shannon Seitz, 2007. "Consumption inequality and intra-household allocations," IFS Working Papers W07/09, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
  7. Grossbard, Shoshana & Amuedo-Dorantes, Catalina, 2007. "Cohort-Level Sex Ratio Effects on Women’s Labor Force Participation," IZA Discussion Papers 2722, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  8. Daniela Del Boca & Christopher J. Flinn, 2005. "Household Time Allocation and Models of Behavior: A Theory of Sorts," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 8, Collegio Carlo Alberto, revised 2006.
  9. Martin Browning & Pierre-Andre Chiappori, 1994. "Efficient Intra-Household Allocations: a General Characterization and Empirical Tests," Department of Economics Working Papers 1994-02, McMaster University.
  10. Laurens Cherchye & Bram De Rock & Frederic Vermeulen, 2007. "The Collective Model of Household Consumption: A Nonparametric Characterization," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(2), pages 553-574, 03.
  11. Lundberg, Shelly J, 1988. "Labor Supply of Husbands and Wives: A Simultaneous Equations Approach," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 70(2), pages 224-35, May.
  12. Blundell, Richard & Chiappori, Pierre-André & Magnac, Thierry & Meghir, Costas, 2005. "Collective Labour Supply: Heterogeneity and Nonparticipation," IZA Discussion Papers 1785, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  13. Robinson, Peter M, 1988. "Root- N-Consistent Semiparametric Regression," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 931-54, July.
  14. Thomas, D., 1989. "Intra-Household Resource Allocation: An Inferential Approach," Papers 586, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
  15. Shelly Lundberg & Robert Pollak, 2003. "Efficiency in Marriage," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 153-167, September.
  16. Shannon Seitz, 2009. "Accounting for Racial Differences in Marriage and Employment," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 27(3), pages 385-437, 07.
  17. repec:bla:restud:v:74:y:2007:i:2:p:507-535 is not listed on IDEAS
  18. Chiappori, P.A., 1989. "Collective Labour Supply and Welfare," DELTA Working Papers 89-07, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
  19. Grossbard-Shechtman, Shoshana Amyra, 1984. "A Theory of Allocation of Time in Markets for Labour and Marriage," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(376), pages 863-82, December.
  20. Chiappori, Pierre-André & Fortin, Bernard & Lacroix, Guy, 1998. "Household Labor Supply, Sharing Rule and the Marriage Market," Cahiers de recherche 9810, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
  21. Chiappori, Pierre-André & Iyigun, Murat & Weiss, Yoram, 2006. "Investment in Schooling and the Marriage Market," IZA Discussion Papers 2454, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  22. Murat Nick & P. Randall Walsh, 2007. "Building the Family Nest: Premarital Investments, Marriage Markets, and Spousal Allocations," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 74(2), pages 507-535.
  23. Van Der Klaauw, W., 1993. "Female Labor Supply and Marital Status Decisions: A Life Cycle Model," Working Papers 93-23, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  24. Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-46, July-Aug..
  25. Aloysius Siow, 2008. "How does the marriage market clear? An empirical framework," Working Papers tecipa-322, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  26. Fortin, Bernard & Lacroix, Guy, 1997. "A Test of the Unitary and Collective Models of Household Labour Supply," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(443), pages 933-55, July.
  27. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1988. "Rational Household Labor Supply," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(1), pages 63-90, January.
  28. Kosei Fukuda, 2006. "A cohort analysis of female labor participation rates in the U.S. and Japan," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 379-393, December.
  29. Marjorie B. McElroy, 1990. "The Empirical Content of Nash-Bargained Household Behavior," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 25(4), pages 559-583.
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Cited by:
  1. Nicolas Jacquemet & Jean-Marc Robin, 2011. "Marriage with Labor Supply," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/eu4vqp9ompq, Sciences Po.
  2. Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Yoram Weiss & Murat Iyigun & Yoram Weiss, 2006. "Investment in Schooling and the Marriage Market," 2006 Meeting Papers 43, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  3. Bruze, Gustaf, 2010. "Male and Female Marriage Returns to Schooling," Working Papers 10-17, University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics.

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