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Building the Family Nest: A Collective Household Model with Competing Pre-Marital Investments and Spousal Matching

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  • Randall P. Walsh
  • Murat F. Iyigun

Abstract

We develop a model of the household in which spousal incomes are determined by pre-marital investments, the marriage market is charaterized by assortative matching, and endogenously-determined sharing rules form the basis of intra-household allocations. By incorporating pre-marital investments and spousal matching into the collective household model, we are able to (a) establish the welfare implications of the collective model for pre-marital choices and spousal matching and (b) identify the fundamental determinants of endogenously-determined and maritally sustainable intra-marital sharing rules. In particular, we find that all sharing rules along the assortative order support unconditionally efficient outcomes where both pre-marital investments and intra-household allocations are efficient. We also show that, for each couple, the marriage market generates a unique and maritally sustainable sharing rule that is a function of the distribution of pre-marital endowments and the sex ratios in the market.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2004 Meeting Papers with number 168.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:red:sed004:168

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Related research

Keywords: The Collective Model; Marriage; Bargaining; Household Labor Supply;

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Cited by:
  1. Del Boca, Daniela & Flinn, Christopher J., 2014. "Household behavior and the marriage market," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 515-550.
  2. Del Boca, Daniela & Flinn, Christopher, 2005. "Household Time Allocation and Modes of Behavior: A Theory of Sorts," IZA Discussion Papers 1821, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  3. Iyigun, Murat & Walsh, Randall P., 2007. "Endogenous gender power, household labor supply and the demographic transition," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 138-155, January.
  4. Aloysius Siow & Eugene Choo, 2007. "Lifecycle marriage matching: Theory and Evidence," 2007 Meeting Papers 550, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  5. Iyigun, Murat, 2005. "Bargaining and Specialization in Marriage," IZA Discussion Papers 1744, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

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