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Marriage, Specialization, and the Gender Division of Labor Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Matthew J. Baker
Joyce P. Jacobsen
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We consider why the gender division of labor is so often enforced by custom and why customary gender divisions of labor generally involve both direction and prohibition. In our formal model, agents first learn skills and then enter the marriage market. We show that wasteful behavior may emerge due to strategic incentives in specialization choice and human capital acquisition and that both problems may be mitigated through a customary gender division of labor. This division is not Pareto improving. Both the distributional effects and welfare gains of a customary gender division of labor decrease as opportunities for market exchange increase.
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Article provided by University of Chicago Press in its journal Journal of Labor Economics .
Volume (Year): 25 (2007)
Issue (Month): ()
Pages: 763-793
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Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:25:y:2007:p:763-793Contact details of provider: Postal: The University of Chicago Press, Journals Division, P.O. Box 37005 Chicago, IL 60637 Fax: (773) 753-0811 Email: Web page: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/JOLE/home.html
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Paper Matthew J. Baker & Joyce P. Jacobsen, 2003.
"Marriage, Specialization, and the Gender Division of Labor ,"
Departmental Working Papers
1, United States Naval Academy Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Matthew J. Baker & Joyce P. Jacobsen, 2005.
"Marriage, Specialization, and the Gender Division of Labor ,"
Wesleyan Economics Working Papers
2005-001, Wesleyan University, Department of Economics.
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"Marital Division of Labor with Risk of Divorce: The Role of "Voice" Enforcement of Contracts ,"
Journal of Labor Economics ,
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Konrad, K.A. & Lommerud, K.E., 2000.
"The Bargaining Family Revisited ,"
Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen
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Konrad, Kai A & Lommerud, Kjell Erik, 1996.
"The Bargaining Family Revisited ,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
1312, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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[Downloadable!] (restricted) repec:att:wimass:192022 is not listed on IDEAS
repec:bep:theadv:v:1:y:2001:i:advances/1/1:p:1005-1005 is not listed on IDEAS
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Other versions:
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Matthew J. Baker & Joyce P. Jacobsen, 2003.
"A Human Capital-Based Theory of Post-Marital Residence Rules ,"
Departmental Working Papers
2, United States Naval Academy Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Matthew J. Baker & Joyce P. Jacobsen, 2005.
"A Human Capital-Based Theory of Post Marital Residence Rules ,"
Wesleyan Economics Working Papers
2005-006, Wesleyan University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Matthew J. Baker & Joyce P. Jacobsen, 2007.
"A Human Capital-Based Theory of Postmarital Residence Rules ,"
Journal of Law, Economics and Organization ,
Oxford University Press, vol. 23(1), pages 208-241, April.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Pierre-André Chiappori & Murat Iyigun & Yoram Weiss, 2006.
"Investment in Schooling and the Marriage Market ,"
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2454, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
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"The Division of Labor by New Parents: Does Child Gender Matter? ,"
IZA Discussion Papers
1787, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
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Iyigun, Murat, 2009.
"Marriage, Cohabitation and Commitment ,"
IZA Discussion Papers
4341, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
[Downloadable!]
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