Stable Partnerships, Matching, and Local Public Goods
AbstractIn the presence of local public goods differences in tastes are an important determinant of the way in which partnerships are formed. Heterogeneity in tastes for private vs. public goods produces a tendency to positive assortment and partnerships of couples with similar tastes; heterogeneity in tastes for different public goods brings about partnerships of couples with similar tastes only if there is a significant overlap in the distribution of tastes of the two groups to be matched. We show that with two public goods we may get negative assortment, pure positive assortment being only one of many possibilities.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh in its series ESE Discussion Papers with number 82.
Date of creation: Mar 2004
Date of revision:
Matching; sorting; local public goods; heterogeneity of tastes;
Other versions of this item:
- Clark, Simon & Kanbur, Ravi, 2004. "Stable partnerships, matching, and local public goods," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 905-925, August.
- Clark, Simon & Kanbur, Ravi, 2002. "Stable Partnerships, Matching, and Local Public Goods," Working Papers 127325, Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management.
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2004-03-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-MIC-2004-03-14 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-PBE-2004-03-14 (Public Economics)
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