Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Stable Partnerships, Matching, and Local Public Goods

Contents:

Author Info

  • Simon Clark

    ()

  • Ravi Kanbur

Abstract

In the presence of local public goods differences in tastes are an important determinant of the way in which partnerships are formed. Heterogeneity in tastes for private vs. public goods produces a tendency to positive assortment and partnerships of couples with similar tastes; heterogeneity in tastes for different public goods brings about partnerships of couples with similar tastes only if there is a significant overlap in the distribution of tastes of the two groups to be matched. We show that with two public goods we may get negative assortment, pure positive assortment being only one of many possibilities.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.econ.ed.ac.uk/papers/Stable_Partnerships_Matching_and_Local_Public_Goods.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh in its series ESE Discussion Papers with number 82.

as in new window
Length: 37
Date of creation: Mar 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:edn:esedps:82

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 31 Buccleuch Place, EH8 9JT, Edinburgh
Phone: +44(0)1316508361
Fax: +44(0)1316504514
Web page: http://www.econ.ed.ac.uk/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Matching; sorting; local public goods; heterogeneity of tastes;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 252, David K. Levine.
  2. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1993. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(6), pages 988-1010, December.
  3. Roth, Alvin E. & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1992. "Two-sided matching," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 485-541 Elsevier.
  4. Michael Peters & Aloysius Siow, 2002. "Competing Premarital Investments," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(3), pages 592-608, June.
  5. Konrad, Kai A & Lommerud, Kjell Erik, 1995. " Family Policy with Non-cooperative Families," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 97(4), pages 581-601, December.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Matthew J. Baker & Joyce P. Jacobsen, 2003. "Marriage, Specialization, and the Gender Division of Labor," Departmental Working Papers 1, United States Naval Academy Department of Economics.
  2. Simon Clark, 2007. "Matching and Sorting when Like Attracts Like," ESE Discussion Papers 171, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  3. Simon Clark, 2004. "Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Two-sided Matching," ESE Discussion Papers 84, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
  4. Suman Ghosh & Alexander Karaivanov & Mandar Oak, 2005. "A Case for Bundling Public Goods Contributions?," Working Papers 05005, Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:edn:esedps:82

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Gina Reddie).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.