This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

A Case for Bundling Public Goods Contributions?

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Suman Ghosh () (Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University)
Alexander Karaivanov () (Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University)
Mandar Oak () (Department of Economics, Williams College)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We extend the model of voluntary contributions to multiple public goods by allowing for bundling of the public goods. Specifically, we study the case where agents contribute into a common pool which is then allocated towards the financing of two pure public goods. We explore the welfare implications of allowing for such bundling vis-a-vis a separate contributions scheme. We show that when agents have homogeneous preferences, they cannot be made better off with a bundling scheme. On the contrary, in the generic case when agents are heterogenous in their incomes and preferences, bundling may increase joint welfare compared to a separate contribution scheme, in particular for higher income inequality among the agents. It is interesting to note that the welfare improvement occurs despite a decrease in total contributions. Our findings have implications for the design of charitable institutions and international aid agencies.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help file. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://home.fau.edu/sghosh/web/gkopaper2.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: First version, 2005
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, College of Business, Florida Atlantic University in its series Working Papers with number 05005.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML, plain text, BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF
Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fal:wpaper:05005

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 777 Glades Road, Boca Raton, FL 33431
Phone: (561)-297-3220
Fax: (561)-297-2542
Web page: http://business.fau.edu/economics
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Vadym Volosovych).

Related research
Keywords: Private provision Public goods Bundling

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. repec:att:wimass:1920412 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Norman, Peter & Fang, Hanming, 2004. "An Efficiency Rationale for Bundling of Public Goods," Micro Theory Working Papers norman-04-11-21-09-39-13, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 08 Feb 2005. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Bilodeau, Marc, 1992. "Voluntary contributions to united charities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 119-133, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Steven Durlauf & Marcel Fafchamps, 2004. "Social Capital," Development and Comp Systems 0409060, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Steven N. Durlauf & Marcel Fafchamps, 2004. "Social Capital," NBER Working Papers 10485, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    • Durlauf, Steven N. & Fafchamps, Marcel, 2005. "Social Capital," Handbook of Economic Growth, in: Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 26, pages 1639-1699 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Clark, Simon & Kanbur, Ravi, 2004. "Stable partnerships, matching, and local public goods," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(4), pages 905-925, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Peter Norman & Hanming Fang, 2004. "An Efficiency Rationale for the Bundling of Public Goods," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 458, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  7. Jeff Dayton-Johnson & Pranab Bardhan, 2002. "Inequality And Conservation On The Local Commons: A Theoretical Exercise," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(481), pages 577-602, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Adams, William James & Yellen, Janet L, 1976. "Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 90(3), pages 475-98, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John & Whinston, Michael D, 1989. "Multiproduct Monopoly, Commodity Bundling, and Correlation of Values," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(2), pages 371-83, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Warr, Peter G., 1983. "The private provision of a public good is independent of the distribution of income," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 13(2-3), pages 207-211. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Richard Cornes & Juni-ichi Itaya, 2004. "Models With Two Or More Public Goods," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 896, The University of Melbourne. [Downloadable!]
  12. Andreoni, James, 1988. "Privately provided public goods in a large economy: The limits of altruism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 57-73, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Gradstein, Mark, 1992. "Time Dynamics and Incomplete Information in the Private Provision of Public Goods," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 581-97, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Cornes, Richard, 1993. "Dyke Maintenance and Other Stories: Some Neglected Types of Public Goods," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(1), pages 259-71, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-91, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  17. Bilodeau, Marc & Slivinski, Al, 1997. "Rival charities," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(3), pages 449-467, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? About 2000 working paper series are listed on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2008-8-13.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.