This paper proposes a simple search and bargaining model of marriage. In the young age, each person starts with an endowment of financial resources and an inherited cultural orientation. They acquire a marketable human capital and optimally modify their orientation using this endowment. In the second period of their lives, a search for the right spouse and then bargaining for the household orientation, with the chosen spouse, ensues. The resulting pattern of marriage is shown to evolve an unequal distribution of population across the cultural spectrum with considerable concentration in the middle or moderate region. We also illustrate our model using a preference for fertility and the resultant distribution of population.
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Paper provided by Institute for Social and Economic Research in its series ISER working papers with number
2002-15.
Length: 40 Date of creation: Sep 2002 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:ese:iserwp:2002-15
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