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Individual decisions and household demand for consumption and leisure

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  • Chiuri, Maria Concetta

Abstract

The standard microeconomic assumption of a household utility function raises two theoretical problems: it contradicts methodological individualism and it ignores economic phenomena like income and consumption sharing, division of labour, externalities and altruism within a household. This paper reviews two approaches, aggregation theory and more recent non-unitary models, to compare the different properties that household consumption and leisure demands have to satisfy in the two basic contexts. The paper also discusses some recent empirical evidence which seems to encourage further investigation in the non-unitary framework.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Research in Economics.

Volume (Year): 54 (2000)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 277-324

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Handle: RePEc:eee:reecon:v:54:y:2000:i:3:p:277-324

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622941

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Cited by:
  1. Cynthia Bansak & Catalina Amuedo-Dorantes, 2004. "Access to Banking Services and Money Transfers by Mexican Immigrants," Working Papers 0003, San Diego State University, Department of Economics.
  2. Bargain, O. & Beblo, M. & Beninger, D. & Blundell, R. & Carrasco, R. & Chiuri, M-C. & Laisney, F. & Lechene, V. & Moreau, N. & Myck, M. & Ruiz-castillo, J. & Vermeulen, F.M.P., 2006. "Does the representation of household behavior matter for welfare analysis of tax-benefit policies? An introduction," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-194159, Tilburg University.
  3. Chiappori, Pierre-André & Donni, Olivier, 2009. "Non-unitary Models of Household Behavior: A Survey of the Literature," IZA Discussion Papers 4603, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).

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