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Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: A Rejoinder

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  • Chiappori, Pierre-Andre

Abstract

This note is a rejoinder to Marjorie B. McElroy and Mary Jean Horney's (1990) reply. It discusses the scope of McElroy and Horney's previous results, and the possibility of estimating a Nash-bargained model from independent observation of threat points. Copyright 1991 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 32 (1991)
Issue (Month): 3 (August)
Pages: 761-62

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Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:32:y:1991:i:3:p:761-62

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Cited by:
  1. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2005. "Bargaining Power and Equilibrium Consumption," CESifo Working Paper Series 1448, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Prabhu, Vimalanand S., 2010. "Tests of Intrahousehold Resource Allocation Using a CV Framework: A Comparison of Husbands' and Wives' Separate and Joint WTP in the Slums of Navi-Mumbai, India," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 606-619, April.
  3. Pierre-André Chiappori & Olivier Donni, 2006. "Learning from a Piece of Pie: the Empirical Content of Nash Bargaining," Cahiers de recherche 0619, CIRPEE.
  4. Chiappori, Pierre-André & Donni, Olivier, 2009. "Non-unitary Models of Household Behavior: A Survey of the Literature," IZA Discussion Papers 4603, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  5. Angelov, Nikolay & Johansson, Per & Lindahl, Erica, 2013. "Is the persistent gender gap in income and wages due to unequal family responsibilities?," Working Paper Series 2013:3, IFAU - Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education Policy.
  6. Hærnes, Erik & Jia, Zhiyang & Strøm, Steinar, 2005. "Retirement in Non-Cooperative and Cooperative Families," Memorandum 15/2006, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  7. Valérie Lechene & Ian Preston, 2005. "Household Nash equilibrium with voluntarily contributed public goods," IFS Working Papers W05/06, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
  8. Pierre-André Chiappori & Olivier Donni, 2004. "Les modèles non-unitaires de comportement du ménage: un survol de la littérature," Cahiers de recherche 0426, CIRPEE.
  9. Xu, Zeyu, 2007. "A survey on intra-household models and evidence," MPRA Paper 3763, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  10. Aura, Saku, 2005. "Does the balance of power within a family matter? The case of the Retirement Equity Act," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1699-1717, September.
  11. Erik Hernæs & Zhiyang Jia & Steinar Strøm, 2003. "Macroeconomic Effects of Sectoral Shocks in Germany, the U.K. and, the U.S," CHILD Working Papers wp04_03, CHILD - Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic economics - ITALY.
  12. Bargain, Olivier & Moreau, Nicolas, 2005. "Cooperative Models in Action: Simulation of a Nash-Bargaining Model of Household Labor Supply with Taxation," IZA Discussion Papers 1480, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  13. Olivier Bargain & Nicolas Moreau, 2013. "The Impact of Tax-Benefit Reforms on Labor Supply in a Simulated Nash-bargaining Framework," Journal of Family and Economic Issues, Springer, vol. 34(1), pages 77-86, March.

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