This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Household Nash Equilibrium with Voluntarily Contributed Public Goods

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Valerie Lechene
Ian Preston

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

We study noncooperative models with two agents and several voluntarily contributed public goods. We focus on interior equilibria in which neither agent is bound by non negativity constraints, establishing the conditions for existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. While adding-up and homogneity hold, negativity and symmetry properties are generally violated. We derive the counterpart to the Slutsky matrix, and show that it can be decomposed into the sum of a symmetric and negative semidefinite matrix and another the rank of which never exceeds the number of public goods plus one. Under separability of the public goods the deviation from symmetry is at most rank two.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/Research/wp/pdf/paper226.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number 226.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:oxf:wpaper:226

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Manor Rd. Building, Oxford, OX1 3UQ
Email:
Web page: http://www.economics.ox.ac.uk/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Mark George).

Related research
Keywords: Nash Equilibrum; Intra-household Allocation; Slutsky Symmetry;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Deaton, A., 1990. "Price Elasticities From Surveys Data: Extensions And Indonesian Results," Papers 69, World Bank - Living Standards Measurement.
    Other versions:
  2. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "A Theory of Social Interactions," NBER Working Papers 0042, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Ted Bergstrom, 1989. "A Fresh Look at the Rotten Kid Theorem--And Other Household Mysteries," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 1989A, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Bourguignon, F. & Browning, M. & Chiappori, P. A., 1995. "The Collective Approach to Household Behaviour," DELTA Working Papers 95-04, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
  5. Chen, Zhiqi & Woolley, Frances, 2001. "A Cournot-Nash Model of Family Decision Making," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(474), pages 722-48, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Martin Browning & P.A. Chiappori, 1996. "Efficient Intra-Household Allocations - A General Characterization and Empirical Tests," Discussion Papers 96-10, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
  7. Eduardo Ley, 1996. "On the private provision of public goods: a diagrammatic exposition," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 20(1), pages 105-123, January. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. James Banks & Richard Blundell & Arthur Lewbel, 1997. "Quadratic Engel Curves And Consumer Demand," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 79(4), pages 527-539, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Bergstrom, Ted C. & Blume, Larry & Varian, Hal, 1992. "Uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in private provision of public goods : An improved proof," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 391-392, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Martin Browning & Pierre-André Chiappori & Valérie Lechene, 2004. "Collective and Unitary Models: a Clarification," CAM Working Papers 2004-15, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. Centre for Applied Microeconometrics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1991. "Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: A Rejoinder," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(3), pages 761-62, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Browning, M. & Bourguignon, F. & Chiappori, P.A. & Lechene, V., 1992. "Incomes and Outcomes: A structural Model of Intra-Household Allocation," DELTA Working Papers 92-23, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
    Other versions:
  13. Kemp, Murray C., 1984. "A note of the theory of international transfers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 14(2-3), pages 259-262. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Fraser, Clive D., 1992. "The uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in the private provision of public goods : An alternative proof," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 389-390, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1988. "Nash-Bargained Households Decisions: A Comment," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 29(4), pages 791-96, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Richard C. Cornes & Emilson C. D. Silva, 1999. "Rotten Kids, Purity, and Perfection," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(5), pages 1034-1040, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  17. McElroy, Marjorie B & Horney, Mary Jean, 1990. "Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Reply," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 31(1), pages 237-42, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Diewert, W. E., 1977. "Generalized slutsky conditions for aggregate consumer demand functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 353-362, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Warr, Peter G., 1983. "The private provision of a public good is independent of the distribution of income," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 13(2-3), pages 207-211. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Browning, Martin & Meghir, Costas, 1991. "The Effects of Male and Female Labor Supply on Commodity Demands," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(4), pages 925-51, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Manser, Marilyn & Brown, Murray, 1980. "Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 21(1), pages 31-44, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Valérie Lechene & Ian Preston, 2008. "Non cooperative household demand," IFS Working Papers W08/14, Institute for Fiscal Studies. [Downloadable!]
  2. Valérie Lechene & Ian Preston, 2007. "Demand properties in household Nash equilibrium," IFS Working Papers W07/01, Institute for Fiscal Studies. [Downloadable!]
  3. Claude d’Aspremont & Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira, 2009. "Household behavior and individual autonomy," Working Papers of BETA 2009-17, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, ULP, Strasbourg. [Downloadable!]
  4. Martin Browning & Pierre André Chiappori & Valérie Lechene, 2007. "Distributional effects in household models: separate spheres and income pooling," IFS Working Papers W07/03, Institute for Fiscal Studies. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Martin Browing & Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Valerie Lechene, 2006. "Quelques resultats sur l`effet des transferts cibles," Economics Series Working Papers 294, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS also indexes books.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-18.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.