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Distributional effects in household models: separate spheres and income pooling

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  • Martin Browning

    ()
    (Institute for Fiscal Studies and Nuffield College, Oxford)

  • Pierre André Chiappori

    (Institute for Fiscal Studies and Columbia University)

  • Valérie Lechene

    (Institute for Fiscal Studies and University College London)

Abstract

We derive distributional effects for a non-cooperative alternative to the unitary model of household behaviour. We consider the Nash equilibria of a voluntary contributions to public goods game. Our main result is that, in general, the two partners either choose to contribute to di¤erent public goods or they contribute to at most one common good. The former case corresponds to the separate spheres case of Lundberg and Pollak (1993). The second outcome yields (local) income pooling. A household will be in different regimes depending on the distribution of income within the household. Any bargaining model with this non-cooperative case as a breakdown point will inherit the local income pooling. We conclude that targeting benefits such as child benefits to one household member may not always have an effect on outcomes.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute for Fiscal Studies in its series IFS Working Papers with number W07/03.

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Length: 13 pp.
Date of creation: Jan 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ifs:ifsewp:07/03

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  1. Kemp, Murray C., 1984. "A note of the theory of international transfers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 14(2-3), pages 259-262.
  2. Warr, Peter G., 1983. "The private provision of a public good is independent of the distribution of income," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 13(2-3), pages 207-211.
  3. Valerie Lechene & Ian Preston, 2005. "Household Nash Equilibrium with Voluntarily Contributed Public Goods," Economics Series Working Papers 226, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  4. Lundberg, S.J. & Pollak, R.A. & Wales, T.J., 1994. "Do Husbands and Wives Pool Their Resources? Evidence from U.K. Child Benefit," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 94-6, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
  5. Lundberg, S. & Pollak, R.A., 1991. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Discussion Papers in Economics at the University of Washington 91-08, Department of Economics at the University of Washington.
  6. Bergstrom, Theodore & Blume, Lawrence & Varian, Hal, 1986. "On the private provision of public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 25-49, February.
  7. Richard Blundell & Pierre-Andr� Chiappori & Costas Meghir, 2005. "Collective Labor Supply with Children," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(6), pages 1277-1306, December.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Laurens CHERCHYE & Thomas DEMUYNCK & Bram DE ROCK, 2010. "Noncooperative household consumption with caring," Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers ces10.34, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën.
  2. Wiktor Adamowicz & Mark Dickie & Shelby Gerking & Marcella Veronesi & David Zinner, 2013. "Household Decision-Making and Valuation of Environmental Health Risks to Parents and their Children," NCEE Working Paper Series 201306, National Center for Environmental Economics, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, revised Dec 2013.
  3. Melanie Lührmann & Jürgen Maurer, 2007. "Who wears the trousers? A semiparametric analysis of decision power in couples," CeMMAP working papers CWP25/07, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
  4. Valerie Lechene & Martin Browning, 2006. "Quelques resultats sur l`effet des transferts cibles," Economics Series Working Papers 294, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
  5. repec:ese:iserwp:2014-13 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. d’ASPREMONT, Claude & DOS SANTOS FERREIRA, Rodolphe, 2009. "Household behavior and individual autonomy," CORE Discussion Papers 2009022, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  7. Miriam Beblo & Denis Beninger, 2012. "Do husbands and wives pool their incomes? Experimental evidence," Working Papers of BETA 2012-10, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
  8. Laurens CHERCHYE & Thomas DEMUYNCK & Bram DE ROCK & Frederic VERMEULEN, 2014. "Household consumption when the marriage is stable," Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers ces14.08, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Centrum voor Economische Studiën.
  9. Claude d’Aspremont & Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira, 2014. "Household behavior and individual autonomy: an extended Lindahl mechanism," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 55(3), pages 643-664, April.
  10. Jens Bonke & Hans Uldall-Poulsen, 2007. "Why do families actually pool their income? Evidence from Denmark," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 5(2), pages 113-128, June.
  11. Sabrina Bruyneel & Laurens Cherchye & Bram De Rock, 2012. "Collective consumption models with restricted bargaining weights: an empirical assessment based on experimental data," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 395-421, September.
  12. Lechene, Valérie & Preston, Ian, 2011. "Noncooperative household demand," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 504-527, March.

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