Allocations familiales et autres transferts cibles sont generalement verses aux meres, sur la base de l`observation qu`augmenter la part des ressources controlees par les meres conduit a ameliorer le bien-etre des enfants. Nous recensons un ensemble de resultats empiriques qui etablisent le bien-fonde de ces mesures. Nous contrastons ensuite les predictions theoriques des principales alternatives au modele standard de comportement des menages, le modele unitaire. Ceci permet d`etablir que l`effet predit des transferts depend des preferences individuelles et du pouvoir des membres du menage, mais aussi crucialement de la forme des interactions dans le menage.
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Paper provided by University of Oxford, Department of Economics in its series Economics Series Working Papers with number
294.
Find related papers by JEL classification: D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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